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Articles
Instrumental Music and the First Amendment
Alan K. Chen*
This Article critically examines what would seem to be, but is not, an easy free speech
question: whether instrumental music falls within the scope of the First Amendment.
The Supreme Court has long recognized that musical expression is “speech,” but has
never analyzed why this is the case. Similarly, scholarly literature is surprisingly bereft
of any comprehensive examination of whether there are sound theoretical or doctrinal
foundations for treating purely instrumental music as a form of constitutionally
protected expression. This Article engages this question comprehensively, and argues
that there are two strong claims for the coverage of instrumental music under the First
Amendment. First, instrumental music can be understood as speech because of its
central role in expressing cultural, religious, nationalist, and other social values that
might otherwise be at risk of government control and orthodoxy. Second, music serves
a unique communicative function as a facilitator of emotional expression, experience,
and autonomy.
In examining these claims, the Article first surveys existing judicial and scholarly
treatments of music as speech to illustrate how our understanding of the expressive
value of instrumental music has been undertheorized. It then briefly catalogues
historical and contemporary instances of instrumental music censorship by
governments and other powerful institutions both within the United States and in other
nations. First Amendment theory does not offer an obvious explanation for why
instrumental music should be protected. Thus, the Article next considers the three
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dominant theoretical justifications for protection of expression—promotion of
democratic self-governance; facilitation of the search for truth; and protection of
autonomy through self-realization—and explores the possibilities for and limits of
employing any of these three theories to justify protection of instrumental music.
To truly understand how these speech theories might apply, however, one must first
comprehend the nature of instrumental musical expression. Accordingly, this Article
next discusses exactly what it is that instrumental music expresses and how it does so,
and examines how those conceptualizations fit within the frameworks of the three
dominant speech theories. This Part concludes with an elaboration of the claim that
music is like speech because of its unique power to convey cultural and other social
values and promote emotional expression and experience in its composers, performers,
and listeners. Music, then, falls within both the truth-seeking and self-realization
justifications for the First Amendment. In contrast, theoretical explanations for free
speech grounded in democracy do not map well onto non-lyrical musical expression.
Finally, this Article argues that a better understanding of the relationship between
instrumental music and the First Amendment may illuminate free speech theory more
broadly. First, it moves the recent discourse on First Amendment “coverage” forward
by examining a context that requires consideration of nonrepresentational expression in
its purest form. Second, clarification about the valid justifications for coverage of
instrumental music has important ramifications for how we think about the regulation
of other artistic expression as well as other types of nonverbal expression, such as nonobscene pornography and subliminal advertising.
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“After silence, that which comes nearest to expressing the inexpressible
is music.”
—Aldous Huxley, The Rest is Silence, in Music at Night 19, 19
(1931).
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If a picture is worth a thousand words, what about a C#? Or the
flatted third, fifth, or seventh note in a blues scale? Or a glissando, or
other run of musical notes strung together in a particular sequence and
rhythm, such as a Gregorian chant, the first four notes of Beethoven’s
Fifth Symphony, the syncopated piano introduction to Dave Brubeck’s
“Blue Rondo À La Turk,” or the trademark guitar riff at the opening of
Jimi Hendrix’s “Purple Haze”? The Supreme Court and lower courts
have long accepted that musical expression falls within the category of
“speech” safeguarded by the First Amendment.1 But no court has ever
explained in any meaningful way why the musical, as opposed to lyrical,
component of such expression is independently covered by the
Constitution. There has been no comprehensive examination of the
reasons justifying the constitutional coverage and protection of the tonal
and rhythmic elements that define what we recognize as instrumental
music.
The scholarly literature is also surprisingly bereft of comprehensive
discussions of the theoretical or doctrinal foundations for treating purely
instrumental music as expression under the Constitution. Typically,
music2 is treated as an aside or is lumped in for discussion with other
forms of nonverbal artistic expression, such as painting and sculpture.3
Commentators have paid far less attention to the unique elements of
pure musical expression.4 In this Article, I attempt to fill that gap by
examining, challenging, and defending the conclusion that instrumental
music is speech and is worthy of robust First Amendment protection

1. See, e.g., Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557,
569 (1995); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989); Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d
1087, 1093 (9th Cir. 2009).
2. For the most part, when I refer to “music” throughout this Article, I mean instrumental music.
3. A number of scholars have done excellent work engaging the broader topic of art and
freedom of expression. See, e.g., Randall P. Bezanson, Art and Freedom of Speech (2009)
[hereinafter Bezanson, Art and Freedom]; Amy Adler, What’s Left?: Hate Speech, Pornography,
and the Problem for Artistic Expression, 84 Calif. L. Rev. 1499 (1996); Randall P. Bezanson, Art and
the Constitution, 93 Iowa L. Rev. 1593 (2008) [hereinafter Bezanson, Art and the Constitution];
Edward J. Eberle, Art as Speech, 11 U. Pa. J.L. & Soc. Change 1 (2007); Marci A. Hamilton, Art
Speech, 49 Vand. L. Rev. 73 (1996); Sheldon H. Nahmod, Artistic Expression and Aesthetic Theory:
The Beautiful, the Sublime and the First Amendment, 1987 Wis. L. Rev. 221; Mark Tushnet, Art and
the First Amendment, 35 Colum. J.L. & Arts 169 (2012).
4. A recent, but valuable exception is a student note. See David Munkittrick, Note, Music as
Speech: A First Amendment Category Unto Itself, 62 Fed. Comm. L.J. 665 (2010); see also Tushnet,
supra note 3, at 203 n.117 (describing Munkittrick’s note as “one of the few efforts to analyze music’s
First Amendment coverage”). Music has been discussed in other legal literature as a model for legal
interpretation, but that work is not directly relevant to the issues I consider in this Article. See
generally Jack M. Balkin, Verdi’s High C, 91 Tex. L. Rev. 1687 (2013); Sanford Levinson & J. M.
Balkin, Law, Music, and Other Performing Arts, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1597 (1991) (comparing legal
interpretation to musicians’ interpretation of scores with strict or liberal construction of the
composers’ intent); Richard A. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 1365 (1990) (reviewing
Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law (1989)).
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comparable to the safeguards that are commonplace for most verbal
expression. In doing so, I offer what I hope to be the first full theoretical
account supporting the idea that instrumental musical expression is
constitutionally equivalent to speech.
Instrumental music is a somewhat curious free speech topic. Perhaps
it has not received serious attention in First Amendment doctrine and
theory because it is inaccurately perceived to be an easy question. It is
likely, for example, that most professional and lay observers instinctively
believe instrumental music is constitutionally protected. It is difficult to
imagine a functioning democracy in which the state could control the
communication of musical notes and rhythms any more than we would
tolerate, in most cases, the regulation of pure speech. Moreover, we also
cannot imagine circumstances in which such censorship would occur. It
seems implausible that the government or other institutional powers
would restrict instrumental music or that they would ever have a reason
to do so.
Yet, they have. In just the past few years, two federal appellate
courts upheld the actions of local school districts that had banned
exclusively instrumental music from performance by students during
public school programs because of the music’s religious content.5 In both
cases, the school districts successfully defeated the students’ free speech
claims by arguing that the Establishment Clause required them to avoid
endorsing religious speech, and in one case, on the ground that the state
had the authority to control musical content because of the limited
nature of schools as a public forum.6
Federally licensed broadcasters and private businesses influenced by
the Recording Industry Association of America (“RIAA”) have
prohibited or regulated purely instrumental music.7 In Israel, there was,
until relatively recently, an informal, though widely implemented ban on
the performance of works composed by Richard Wagner.8 And while
censorship of music in democratic states has been relatively rare,
totalitarian regimes throughout history have wielded state power to
censor instrumental music they viewed with suspicion. Instrumental
music bans were commonplace in Nazi Germany and the former Soviet

5. See Stratechuk v. Bd. of Educ., 587 F.3d 597, 610 (3d Cir. 2009); Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d
1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 2009).
6. See Stratechuk, 587 F.3d at 610; Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1090.
7. See Eric Nuzum, Parental Advisory: Music Censorship in America 254–55 (2001); Adam
Bernstein, Guitarist Link Wray Dies; Influenced Punk, Grunge, Wash. Post, Nov. 22, 2005, at B5;
Martin Horsfield, This Record Must Not Be Broadcast, Guardian, Sept. 20, 2008, at 25. Of course,
instances of censorship of music because of its lyrics have also occurred. See, e.g., Luke Records, Inc.
v. Navarro, 960 F.2d 134, 135 (11th Cir. 1992).
8. See Munkittrick, supra note 4, at 673–74.
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Republic.9 More contemporary examples of censorship can be found in
other cultures, particularly those with sectarian-dominated government
regimes, such as Iran and the Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.10 As a
basis for the later discussion of First Amendment theory, Part I of this
Article surveys the slim judicial and scholarly treatments of music as
speech to illustrate how our understanding of the expressive value of
instrumental music has been undertheorized, and then briefly catalogues
these historical and contemporary instances of the censorship of
instrumental music.
Though instrumental music is probably widely understood as a form
of expression, current theory and doctrine do not offer an easy
explanation for why it should fall within the scope of the First
Amendment. Thus, Part II of this Article surveys the three dominant
theoretical justifications for protection of free expression—promotion of
democratic self-governance; facilitation of the search for truth; and
protection of autonomy through self-realization—and explores the
possibilities for and limits of employing any of these three theories to
justify protection of instrumental music. Theoretical explanations for
free speech grounded in the promotion of democratic self-governance11
do not map well onto non-lyrical musical expression. Nor is it selfevident that protection of instrumental music is necessary to protect the
marketplace of ideas in order to facilitate the search for truth, at least
without embracing an unbounded definition of truth. Autonomy-based
justifications for protection of expression provide what is probably the
most intuitive basis for understanding instrumental music as speech. But
as we will see, autonomy arguments for speech are also vulnerable to
boundary claims, and a full exploration of the issue at hand must address
those claims and precisely articulate what autonomy means in the context
of the right to compose, perform, and listen to instrumental music.
The most fundamental challenge of harmonizing instrumental music
with the dominant free speech theories is discerning exactly what it is

9. See Jonathan Green, Encyclopedia of Censorship 590 (Nicholas J. Karolides ed., 2d ed.
2005); Michael Haas, Forbidden Music: The Jewish Composers Banned by the Nazis 226, 231–35
(2013); Erik Levi, Music in the Third Reich 86 (1994); Allan Kozinn, Mendelssohn, This Is Your
Moment, N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 2009, at AR29; Mansur Mirovalev, Once-Banned Shostakovich Ballet
Triumphs, Wash. Post (June 15, 2007, 3:27 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2007/06/15/AR2007061501128_pf.html.
10. Stephen Moss, The Hills Are Alive, Guardian, Nov. 15, 2001, at A2. But see Umar F. AbdAllah, Living Islam with Purpose, 7 UCLA J. Islamic & Near E. L. 17, 24, 30–31 (2008) (observing
that the Islamic view on instrumental music is not “immutably fixed” and that some minority
viewpoints would permit music to be performed in some contexts); Robert Tait, Iran’s “Culturally
Inappropriate” Rock Hopefuls Struggle To Be Heard, Guardian, Aug. 23, 2005, at 13.
11. See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1
(1971).
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that such music expresses and how it does so. Thus, Part III explores five
possible ways of viewing instrumental music as speech and examines how
those conceptualizations might fit within the frameworks of the three
dominant speech theories. First, I explore whether the First Amendment
might cover instrumental music because of the music’s appeal to the
cognitive. Instrumental music may evoke or be associated with specific
thoughts, ideas, or concepts that provoke cognitive responses or
functions in listeners. Music may also be expressive to the degree that it
enhances or colors other communicative vehicles in ways that make their
messages more effective. A third possibility is that instrumental music
does, in fact, have a direct cognitive component that thus far has been
unstudied and unappreciated. Ultimately, however, I conclude that none
of the cognitive theories are sufficient to support the claim that music is
speech.
Next, I examine two different, but compelling, conceptions of
instrumental music’s communicative value. First, throughout history, the
composition, performance, and auditory consumption of musical
expression has played an essential role in forming, shaping, maintaining,
and distinguishing values of culture, religion, and nationalism through a
stunning variety of indigenous music forms and traditions. Second,
simultaneously (and perhaps coextensively), music has long been
understood as a unique form of emotional expression and experience for
its composers, performers, and listeners.
After canvassing the possible ways of understanding how
instrumental music communicates, the discussion circles back to examine
the implications of each of these communicative possibilities for First
Amendment theory. Ultimately, I argue that the strongest claim for the
coverage of instrumental music under the First Amendment can be
derived from its dual role in expressing cultural and other social values
that might otherwise be at risk of government control and orthodoxy and
from its function as a facilitator of emotional expression, experience, and
autonomy. These latter two understandings accept the premise that
instrumental musical expression is nonrepresentational,12 yet provide
compelling support for the claim that in serving these functions, music
advances both the truth-seeking and self-realization objectives of free
speech theory.
A greater understanding of instrumental music as speech also has
substantial value in thinking about other important First Amendment
12. See generally Tushnet, supra note 3. First Amendment scholars use various terms to describe
this characteristic of speech. In addition to nonrepresentational, speech that does not convey a
particular message has been labeled “nonpropositional,” see, e.g., Bezanson, Art and the Constitution,
supra note 3, at 1596, and “non-ideational,” see, e.g., James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy as the
Central Value of American Free Speech Doctrine, 97 Va. L. Rev. 491, 499 n.45 (2011). Throughout
this Article, I use the terms interchangeably.
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questions. Thus, in Part IV, I briefly explore some of the implications of
a more thorough account of music as speech. First, the close examination
of instrumental music follows a broader trend in constitutional law
scholarship that focuses on the important foundational question of the
scope of the First Amendment’s coverage, as opposed to the level of its
constitutional protection.13 If instrumental music is not speech, then we
never reach the subsequent question of whether it is protected. As
Frederick Schauer has observed, the answer to the question of “whether
the First Amendment shows up at all is rarely addressed, and the answer
is too often simply assumed.”14 Those assumptions dictate results in
“easy” cases in both directions, as when we assume without discussion
that criminal threats and securities offerings are not covered by the First
Amendment, or that art and music are. A better understanding of music
as speech can meaningfully contribute to this conversation. Second,
Part IV closes with a brief discussion of how acceptance of one or more
of my arguments for the coverage of instrumental music may affect the
way we think about the regulation of other types of nonverbal expression
that might also claim First Amendment protection, such as non-obscene
pornography and subliminal or image advertising. It also reflects on the
necessity of limiting principles that define the boundaries of what
instrumental music expression ought to be covered by the First
Amendment and why.

I. The Undertheorization of Instrumental Music as Speech
Although music plays a central role in the social, political, and
cultural life of most societies, and has been at the center of several
important judicial disputes, neither the courts nor the academy have
carefully studied its foundations as a type of speech that triggers
constitutional protection.15 As the following Subparts suggest, attention
to this issue has been sparse, incomplete, and unsatisfying.

13. See generally Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1765 (2004); see also Kent Greenawalt,
Speech, Crime, and the Uses of Language 54 (1989); John Greenman, On Communication, 106 Mich.
L. Rev. 1337 (2008); Tushnet, supra note 3 at 174–92; R. George Wright, What Counts as “Speech” in the
First Place?: Determining the Scope of the Free Speech Clause, 37 Pepp. L. Rev. 1217 (2010).
14. Schauer, supra note 13, at 1767.
15. First Amendment law is by no means the only area in which music and law uncomfortably
coexist. See James Boyle, The Public Domain: Enclosing the Commons of the Mind 122 (2008)
(“Music is hard for copyright law to handle.”); Michael W. Carroll, Whose Music Is It Anyway?: How
We Came to View Musical Expression as a Form of Property, 72 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1405, 1407 (2004).
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A. The Courts

1.

Coverage of Nonverbal Expression in General

It has long been understood that notwithstanding its text privileging
the “freedom of speech,” the First Amendment’s protection is not
limited to, and indeed is not defined by, written or oral verbal
expression. Some nonverbal communication is covered by the First
Amendment; much verbal expression is not.16 The Supreme Court has
found the following nonverbal, communicative acts to be covered by the
free speech clause: flag burning,17 cross burning,18 participating in a
parade,19 picketing,20 nude dancing,21 and wearing a black armband.22 As
discussed in detail below, instrumental music and other nonverbal artistic
expression have also been deemed to be covered, though with very little
analysis.
The Court has not been particularly precise about defining when
nonverbal communication falls within the First Amendment’s coverage.
Among the tests that it (sometimes) uses to discern between
communicative acts and uncovered conduct is the one from Spence v.
Washington.23 Spence challenged his state law conviction for “improper
use” of a flag when he displayed an upside down American flag on which
he had placed large peace symbols made of black tape.24 The Court
underscored that, because Spence did not use “printed or spoken words,”
it was necessary to evaluate the context in which he acted “to determine
whether his activity was sufficiently imbued with elements of
communication to fall within the scope of the First Amendment.”25
Spence held that nonverbal conduct is speech when the speaker has both
“[a]n intent to convey a particularized message . . . and in the
surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that the message
would be understood by those who viewed it.”26 The Court concluded
that Spence’s conduct was covered by the First Amendment because he
testified that he displayed the flag to express his disagreement with the

16. Schauer, supra note 13, at 1773.
17. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 312 (1990); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399 (1989).
18. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 395–96 (1992). But see Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S.
343, 347–48 (2003) (finding that cross burning, while expressive, may be prohibited when accompanied
by intent to intimidate).
19. Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 559 (1995).
20. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 460 (1980).
21. City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 285 (2000).
22. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505–06 (1969).
23. 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
24. Id. at 406–07.
25. Id. at 409.
26. Id. at 410–11.
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U.S. military’s invasion of Cambodia and his dismay about the shootings
of student protestors at Kent State University.27
One might infer from Spence that the intent and understanding
elements of the Court’s analysis determine whether instrumental musical
expression and other forms of nonverbal conduct are covered by the
First Amendment.28 But the Court has not rigidly adhered to the Spence
test. For example, in the first flag burning case, Texas v. Johnson,29 the
Court recognized the burning of an American flag as speech, even
though neither the flag burner’s intent nor the audience’s understanding
of his message could be said to be particularized.30 The protestor’s conduct
could have conveyed a broad dissatisfaction with the United States as a
general matter, or any manner of narrower disagreements with the
nation’s myriad actions and policies. In National Endowment for the
Arts v. Finley,31 in which several artists challenged denial of federal
funding for their work,32 the Court assumed the artwork was expressive
without even discussing whether such art would convey a specific
message that would “be understood by those who viewed it.”33 Thus, it is
not entirely clear that the particularized message requirement is
essential, a point that becomes important when analyzing instrumental
music.
Finley also exposes the Court’s inconsistent application of Spence’s
intent requirement. The artists in that case specifically argued that art is
often ambiguous in its meaning and not always intended to convey a
message.34 Nonetheless, the Court did not dispute the expressive value of
art in rendering its decision.

2.

Coverage of Instrumental Musical Expression in Particular

Although the Supreme Court has addressed and embraced the
constitutional status of musical expression on a handful of occasions, not
once has it closely examined the premises of its own conclusions. Rather
than engaging in a careful or thoughtful consideration of music as speech,

27. Id. at 408, 415.
28. Another possibility is that the Court intended the Spence test to apply only to conduct that is
not self-evidently communicative, and not to forms of nonverbal artistic expression. See Miller v. Civil
City of S. Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1125 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (suggesting that music
is not conduct, but is closer to pure speech), rev’d sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560
(1991). If this is the case, then the Court’s failure to invoke Spence in artistic expression cases is more
understandable, though it has been far from clear in drawing this distinction if that was its intent.
29. 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
30. Id. at 399, 404–06.
31. 524 U.S. 569 (1998).
32. Id. at 573.
33. Spence, 418 U.S. at 411.
34. See Brief for Respondents at 36–37, Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569
(1998) (No. 97-371).
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the Court has instead made superficial assumptions and conveyed lofty,
unquestioning platitudes.35 Perhaps more to the point, it has never
broken musical expression down into its essential components—tonal,
rhythmic, and lyrical—and independently addressed whether each of
them is covered by the First Amendment. Indeed, the phrase “instrumental
music” has never appeared in a Supreme Court opinion. Any thoughtful
analysis of this question requires the disaggregation of the distinct
components of musical expression to help establish a better foundation
for understanding why and in what circumstances it ought to be
constitutionally protected.
In Ward v. Rock Against Racism,36 the Court examined the First
Amendment claims of a nonprofit organization that sponsored an annual
event consisting of speeches and the performance of rock music at a band
shell in Central Park.37 Responding to complaints of nearby residents
and park users, New York City adopted new regulations that required
the organization to use sound equipment and a sound technician
provided by the city. The organization’s free speech claim was that the
city’s imposition of these requirements interfered with the performers’
expression because the electronic amplification through the equipment
affected not only the music’s volume, but also the way the sounds were
mixed.38 The regulation thus altered the content of the musical
performances by dictating the outcome and quality of the sound.
While the Court upheld the city’s regulations on the ground that
they were reasonable restrictions on the manner of speech in a public
forum, it deemed the predicate claim that music is speech under the First
Amendment to be self-evident:
Music is one of the oldest forms of human expression. From Plato’s
discourse in the Republic to the totalitarian state in our own times,
rulers have known its capacity to appeal to the intellect and to the
emotions, and have censored musical compositions to serve the needs
of the state. The Constitution prohibits any like attempts in our own
legal order. Music, as a form of expression and communication, is
protected under the First Amendment. In the case before us . . . the
constitutional challenge is to the city’s regulation of the musical aspects

35. As Mark Tushnet observes about the Court’s treatment of the coverage of art in general
under the First Amendment, it has been “remarkably casual.” Tushnet, supra note 3, at 207.
36. 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
37. Id. at 784–85.
38. The city argued that the plaintiff’s sound technicians might not be as familiar with outdoor
sound mixing and with the band shell’s acoustics or other surroundings, and that musicians would
respond to the poor mixing by turning up the volume, thus exacerbating the sound problems the city
was trying to address. Id. at 786; cf. Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 311 (1851) (examining the
constitutionality of a statute requiring shipping companies to hire local pilots to navigate their ships
into port to enhance safety because of the local pilots’ familiarity with the shallow local waters).
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of the concert; and, based on the principle we have stated, the city’s
guideline must meet the demands of the First Amendment.39

Nor did the parties even seriously dispute this proposition.40 However,
the Court never specified whether the rock performances at issue were
vocal or instrumental, and therefore did not unpack the different
components of musical expression and engage in that analysis. Sound
mixing is necessarily about the construction of sound, but it could affect
not only the quality of the instrumental components of the performances,
but also the sound and understandability of lyrics. To the extent that the
status of instrumental music as speech is in question, Ward did not
provide the answer.41
In two other cases, Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad42 and City of
Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc.,43 the Court assumed that music was
covered by the First Amendment, but did not independently consider
whether the musical component of the performances was itself
expressive. And in neither decision did the Court discuss or distinguish
Spence’s particularized message standard.
The closest the Court has come to specifically recognizing
instrumental music as speech is in its consideration of whether parades
are constitutionally protected forms of expression in Hurley v. IrishAmerican Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston.44 Hurley
involved a successful challenge by organizers of a St. Patrick’s Day
parade to a state public accommodations law that had been held to
require them to permit a group of gay, lesbian, and bisexual persons of

39. Ward, 491 U.S. at 790 (citations omitted).
40. Id. Notably, the Ward Court did not even cite the Spence test.
41. But see Miller v. Civil City of S. Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1096 (7th Cir. 1990) (Posner, J.,
concurring) (inferring that the Ward Court did not mean to limit its holding to music with lyrics), rev’d
sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
42. 420 U.S. 546, 547 (1975). In Southeastern Promotions, the Court addressed a prior restraint
challenge by a theater company whose application to perform the musical Hair at a municipal theater
was rejected by city officials on the ground that the play would not be “‘in the best interest of the
community.’” Id. at 548. Although the Court found the city’s actions to be an unconstitutional prior
restraint, its discussion of live musical drama as speech did not disaggregate the musical components
from the lyrics sung by the actors in the play. Rather, as it observed, “[b]y its nature, theater usually is
the acting out—or singing out—of the written word, and frequently mixes speech with live action or
conduct.” Id. at 557–58 (emphasis added). Thus, the Court’s reference to musical expression was
limited to its lyrical components. See Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 65 (1981)
(“Entertainment, as well as political and ideological speech, is protected; motion pictures, programs
broadcast by radio and television, and live entertainment, such as musical and dramatic works, fall
within the First Amendment guarantee.”).
43. 453 U.S. 247, 271 (1981). In Fact Concerts, the Court also assumed without discussion that
music is covered by the First Amendment. Although presented to the Court on the issue of punitive
damages, the case essentially involved a concert promoter’s challenge to a city’s cancellation of a
permit for a performance at a jazz festival on the grounds that the musical group Blood, Sweat and
Tears was a “rock” group rather than a jazz group. Id. at 250–51.
44. 515 U.S. 557, 568–70 (1995).
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Irish descent to participate in the organizers’ parade.45 The Court’s
unanimous opinion in support of the parade organizers’ First
Amendment rights to exclude the gay, lesbian, and bisexual group from
their parade began with a discussion of the speech value of parades.46 In
its analysis, the Court rejected the idea that speech must convey a
“particularized message” to be protected by the First Amendment.47
Such a restrictive interpretation would have meant, the Court observed,
that the First Amendment would not “reach the unquestionably shielded
painting of Jackson Pollock, music of Arnold Schöenberg, or
Jabberwocky verse of Lewis Carroll.”48 Schöenberg, a modern classical
composer, created only instrumental musical works.49 Again, however,
this part of the Court’s decision is a conclusion, not an analysis.
The lower courts have been equally unedifying. In a recent case,
Nurre v. Whitehead,50 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected high
school students’ claims that school administrators’ actions forbidding
them from playing an instrumental version of “Ave Maria” violated their
First Amendment speech rights.51 In cursory fashion, the court declared,
“It is clear to us that purely instrumental music—i.e., music with no
lyrics—is speech.”52 In Stratechuk v. Board of Education,53 the Third
Circuit rejected a similar claim that a public school’s restriction on both
vocal and instrumental religious musical performances at schoolsponsored programs violated students’ right to receive information and
ideas and to learn, as well as their right to academic freedom.54
Stratechuk also failed to specifically address whether the instrumental
musical performances were covered by the First Amendment.55
The most thoughtful lower court discussion of music actually
emerges from a decision about the regulation of nude dancing. In Miller
v. Civil City of South Bend,56 later reversed by the Supreme Court in
45. Id. at 561–64.
46. Id. at 568–70.
47. Id. at 569.
48. Id.
49. See Rovi Staff, Biography of Arnold Schöenberg, AllMusic, http://www.allmusic.com/artist/
arnold-schoenberg-mn0000691043/biography (last visited Feb. 2, 2015).
50. 580 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2009). The unsuccessful plaintiffs petitioned the Supreme Court for a
writ of certiorari, which was denied. Id., cert. denied, 559 U.S. 1025 (2010). But see 559 U.S. 1025
(2010) (Alito, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
51. Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1090.
52. Id. at 1093. The entirety of Nurre’s analysis involved a citation to the Supreme Court’s
decisions in Ward and Hurley, as well as a quote from a parenthetical reference to another Ninth
Circuit case that did nothing but cite Ward as well. Id.
53. 587 F.3d 597 (3d Cir. 2009). The plaintiffs also challenged the school’s policies as violating the
First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. Id. at 599.
54. Id. at 599, 610.
55. Id. at 609–10. In addition, none of the previous decisions in the case, by either the district
court or court of appeals, addressed this issue.
56. 904 F.2d 1081, 1089 (7th Cir. 1990), rev’d sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
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Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,57 several of the circuit judges’ opinions

commented in dicta on whether music was speech under the First
Amendment. Sitting en banc, the Seventh Circuit invalidated a city
ordinance banning public nudity as applied to a commercial
establishment where concededly non-obscene nude dancing was
performed for entertainment.58 In doing so, the court rejected the state
and the dissenters’ arguments distinguishing art from “entertainment,”
noting, among other things, “not all music appeals to the intellect.”59
Concurring in the court’s decision, Judge Posner observed that the
argument that nude dancing is not speech because it does not express
ideas or opinions could also support the claim that “non-vocal” (that is,
instrumental) music is not speech.60 Music, he suggested, is covered by
the First Amendment even when it does not convey a particular message:
[E]ven if “thought,” “concept,” “idea,” and “opinion” are broadly
defined, these are not what most music conveys; and even if music is
regarded as a language, it is not a language for encoding ideas and
opinions. Insofar as it is more than beautiful sound patterns, music, like
striptease, organizes, conveys, and arouses emotion, though not sexual
emotion primarily. If the striptease dancing at the Kitty Kat Lounge is
not expression, Mozart’s piano concertos and Balanchine’s most
famous ballets are not expression.61

He went on to argue that if music must be propositional to count as
speech, it would mean that most instrumental music would receive less
protection than nude dancing, and that “Beethoven’s string quartets are
entitled to less protection than Peter and the Wolf.”62
In his dissent, Judge Easterbrook agreed that music is a form of art
that is protected, but that it is completely distinguishable from nude
dancing in a barroom.63 In his view, music and other art forms are pure
communication, not conduct that is expressive, like flag burning or a strip
tease.64 As he observed:

57. 501 U.S. 560, 565 (1991).
58. Miller, 904 F.2d at 1089.
59. Id. at 1086 (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 1094 (Posner, J., concurring). Judge Posner had made a similar observation, also in
dicta, in an earlier case. See Reed v. Vill. of Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943, 949–50 (7th Cir. 1983)
(“Although the authors of the First Amendment were concerned with protecting political rather than
cultural expression . . . and therefore might not have thought it a violation of the First Amendment for
Congress to pass a law forbidding the playing of Haydn’s string quartets on federal government lands,
the modern view is different. If the defendants passed an ordinance forbidding the playing of rock and
roll music in the Village of Shorewood, they would be infringing a First Amendment right . . . even if
the music had no political message—even if it had no words—and the defendants would have to
produce a strong justification for thus repressing a form of ‘speech.’” (emphasis added)).
61. Miller, 904 F.2d at 1093 (Posner, J., concurring).
62. Id. at 1094.
63. Id. at 1125 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
64. Id.
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People may fairly dispute whether absolute music, such as LaMonte
Young’s Well-Tuned Piano, communicates thoughts, but surely it
embodies them (the right place for the major third, etc.); all that we
call music is the product of rational human thought and appeals at least
in part to the same faculties in others. It has the “capacity to appeal to
the intellect,” . . . is not “conduct,” and is closer to speech (even an
emotional harangue is speech) than to smashing a Ming vase or kicking
a cat, two other ways to express emotion.65

Notwithstanding their fundamental disagreement about the merits of the
case, Judges Posner and Easterbrook elaborated more carefully about
the conception of music as speech than any other judicial actors before or
since.66
B. The Scholarly Literature
Academics have also paid surprisingly little attention to the question
of instrumental music as speech.67 Several excellent scholarly works have
tried to define the more general boundaries of art as speech, but for the
most part, they have done so without identifying music as a unique form
of expression.68 Nonetheless, these commentaries provide an
indispensable starting point, for there is a degree of overlap between the
speech value of other art forms and instrumental music. A common
thread with this work, and one that connects this Article with its
predecessors, is the agreement that free speech theory and doctrine have
not adequately addressed the complex issues associated with artistic
expression.69
Marci Hamilton and Sheldon Nahmod presented earlier treatments
of art and speech that provide useful foundations for thinking about
music. Hamilton argues that art ought to be acknowledged as speech
specifically because of its subversive possibilities, offering its “singular
capacity to offer the experience of new worlds and therefore new
perspectives on the status quo.”70 Thus, art is speech because of its
unique ability to be subversive, to “defamiliarize” conventionality, and to
promote what she calls its “instrumental, liberty-reinforcing role in a
representative democracy.”71
In contrast, Nahmod argues that it is not fruitful to attempt to derive
artistic expression’s value through the lens of political speech. Rather, he

65. Id.
66. The Supreme Court’s decision in Barnes, reversing Miller, does not even discuss music. The
word music appears only once in the entire decision, in a footnote in Justice White’s dissent referring
to the definition of dancing. Barnes, 501 U.S. 560, 587 n.1 (White, J., dissenting).
67. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
68. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
69. See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 3, at 75–76; Nahmod, supra note 3, at 235.
70. Hamilton, supra note 3, at 121.
71. Id. at 75.
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claims that art should be acknowledged as valuable independent of its
role in political discourse (however broadly defined). Drawing on
aesthetic theory, and in particular on Plato and Kant, Nahmod suggests
that art should be independently valued for its ability to promote the
beautiful and the sublime.72 From his perspective, the flaw in most
thinking about art and free speech is the notion that art must convey a
specific message or meaning to fall within the three predominant
justifications for constitutional protection of expression.73
An important recent contribution to the discourse on art and the
First Amendment comes from Mark Tushnet.74 Like me, Tushnet views
questions about art’s coverage as much more complicated than courts
and commentators are inclined to recognize. Though art, like music,
seems like an easy case, there are no easy answers.
Tushnet makes a number of interesting observations, a couple of
which I highlight here. First, he rejects, as do I, what he calls the
“rationality challenge,” which suggests that the question of the First
Amendment’s coverage of art is not an important one because there will
rarely be legitimate governmental reasons to suppress art.75 On this view,
any state regulation of artistic expression would likely be invalidated by a
substantive due process challenge because the state’s action would not be
rational.76 As Tushnet points out, however, there sometimes may be
“legitimate” (though not necessarily compelling) government interests in
regulating art work, such as when highly offensive artwork is displayed
publicly.77
72. Nahmod, supra note 3, at 226–35.
73. Id.
74. See generally Tushnet, supra note 3.
75. Id. at 182–83.
76. Id. For a variation on this argument suggesting that art can be classified as speech because of
the illegitimacy of government motivations for regulating artistic expression, see Frederick Schauer,
Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry 111 (1982) (suggesting that the proper characterization of
artistic expression is a “false problem” because free speech concerns are implicated any time a
regulation is “designed to limit the extent to which people will be influenced by a work of art”); Cass
R. Sunstein, Democracy and the Problem of Freedom of Speech 158 (1993) (claiming that “an effort
to regulate music because it stirs up passionate feeling would run afoul of the free speech clause,
simply because the justification for regulation is constitutionally off-limits”).
77. Tushnet, supra note 3, at 203. Another possibility would be a situation when the government
claims the work is so disturbing that it might incite an immediate riot or other unlawful action. See
Nelson v. Streeter, 16 F.3d 145, 150 (7th Cir. 1994). Government regulation of art is more likely to be
upheld under a due process challenge, but would be subject to a heightened level of scrutiny if art is
covered by the First Amendment. In any event, if there is a choice between considering music as
speech under the First Amendment or a liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment, there is also a
doctrinal reason to focus on speech. The Supreme Court has articulated a preference for analyzing
rights under the narrower, more specific provision of the Constitution that might apply rather than
under due process. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394–95 (1989). For cases addressing musical
expression and some form of due process claim, see Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 454
(1952) (rejecting passengers’ first amendment and substantive due process claims against public
utilities commission for playing music in streetcars and buses); id. at 468–69 (Douglas, J., dissenting)
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To Tushnet’s point, I would add that the rationality challenge is a bit
of an analytical dodge. It is a sort of legal reverse engineering, working
backwards from the lack of governmental interest to define something as
speech, while offering no independent understanding of why speech is
covered by the First Amendment or bears any value at all. There are
many government regulations that might lack a plausible justification,
but that does not make the conduct they regulate speech. Such laws may
still be unconstitutional because they are arbitrary, but not necessarily
because the regulated activity is important or valuable.
Tushnet also makes the case that basing coverage determinations on
the speaker’s intent (as in Spence) is both over-inclusive—violent
conduct intended to convey displeasure with the government is not
covered—and under-inclusive—many artists produce work that is not
intended to convey a specific message.78 He also suggests that focusing
on expression that uses words to define First Amendment coverage is not
particularly helpful because there are clearly ways of communicating an
identifiable message, even an overt political message, that do not use
words, and words do not always even convey meaning.79 This insight is,
of course, essential to thinking about instrumental music, which by
definition is wordless.
Ultimately, after identifying many of the difficulties in justifying the
First Amendment’s coverage of art, Tushnet relies on a type of pragmatic
reasoning to support the claim. First, he says, we might find art to be
covered because it bears a “family resemblance” to political speech.80
Art may not fulfill all of the conditions we typically associate with
speech, but many types of art meet many of the conditions.81 Second,
given that much art fits “enough” of these criteria, he embraces a “rules
versus standards” argument, suggesting that a categorical conclusion that
all art is covered by the First Amendment is probably superior to a caseby-case analysis of how each art work might constitute speech, a decision
that “may well be beyond the capacity of ordinary legal decision makers
to do . . . reliably across the range of problems they may encounter.”82
In addition to the general scholarship on art and the First
Amendment, there has been some academic discussion of government

(arguing that the government’s playing of music was a due process violation because the audience was
captive and could not change the station); Jenkins v. Rumsfeld, 412 F. Supp. 1177, 1179 (E.D. Va.
1976) (rejecting claim by military band members that a law prohibiting them from competing with
local musicians for paid music gigs violated their due process rights).
78. Tushnet, supra note 3, at 187–92.
79. Id. at 192–99; see also Joseph Blocher, Nonsense and the Freedom of Speech: What Meaning
Means for the First Amendment, 63 Duke L.J. 1423 (2014).
80. Tushnet, supra note 3, at 219.
81. Id.
82. Id.
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censorship of music because of its lyrical content.83 For example, there
was considerable deliberation over government attempts in the early
1990s to forbid the sale of 2 Live Crew’s album, “As Nasty As They
Wanna Be,” on the ground that it was legally obscene.84 But in that case,
the court noted that the case appeared to be the first time an appellate
court had been asked to apply the legal standard for obscenity “to a
musical composition, which contains both instrumental music and
lyrics.”85 The lyrical components were clearly the sole basis of the
obscenity claim.86 Accordingly, the scholarly commentary addressed only
that question.87 But legal analysis of government censorship of lyrics,
completely disaggregated from the musical content, ought to be no
different from evaluating censorship of a book, speech, or leaflet. This is
not to say that there are not important social concerns about government
efforts to censor songs, just that they don’t raise interesting conceptual
questions. Although, to the extent the dispute in this case implicates
concerns over the racial component of the band’s musical genre, it may
have some bearing on thinking about music as an expression of cultural
values, which I discuss below.88
With regard to analyzing how First Amendment doctrine and theory
apply to purely instrumental music, the only serious effort of any kind
thus far has been a student note.89 David Munkittrick’s Note shares my
concerns about the lack of recognition, from the courts or the academy,
that instrumental music has not been independently analyzed as a species
of expression.90 Like me, he draws on some aesthetic theory and
83. Though sometimes, the distinction between musical and lyrical content may be difficult to
draw, even for censors. In 1968, an El Paso radio station refused to play Bob Dylan songs because its
management found it too difficult to understand the lyrics, and were reportedly concerned that the
songs might include “politically objectionable or lewd messages.” See Meredith E. Rutledge-Borger,
Rock and Roll vs. Censorship, Rock & Roll Hall of Fame, (Aug. 23, 2013, 9:00 AM), https://rockhall.com/
blog/post/8840_censorship-in-rock-and-roll-history.
84. See, e.g., Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 960 F.2d 134, 136 (11th Cir. 1992).
85. Id. at 135 (emphasis added).
86. Id. Interestingly, however, the lower court judge in that case specifically suggested the
possibility that music without lyrics could be deemed obscene. Skywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro,
739 F. Supp. 578, 591 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (“[I]t would be difficult, albeit not impossible, to find that mere
sound without lyrics is obscene.” (emphasis added)), rev’d sub nom. Luke Records, 960 F.2d 134.
87. The majority of commentary on the 2 Live Crew case appears to come from student notes and
comments. See, e.g., Alexis A. Lury, Note, Time to Surrender: A Call for Understanding and the ReEvaluation of Heavy Metal Music Within the Contexts of Legal Liability and Women, 9 S. Cal. Rev.
L. & Women’s Stud. 155, 178–82 (1999); Kirk A. Olson, Note, Constitutional Law: Can Music Be
Considered Obscene? Skywalker Records, Inc. v. Navarro—The 2 Live Crew, Obscene or
Oppressed?, 44 Okla. L. Rev. 513 (1991).
88. See infra notes 227–257 and accompanying text. For observations about the role of race in a
different controversy surrounding 2 Live Crew, see Bezanson, Art and Freedom, supra note 3, at
184–213 (discussing the copyright dispute regarding the band’s parody of the Roy Orbison song, “Oh,
Pretty Woman”).
89. See generally Munkittrick, supra note 4.
90. Id. at 667.
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approaches from other disciplines and discusses the basic free speech
theories that might apply.91 As with the scholarly work on artistic
expression, his piece provides insight and a valuable starting point. This
Article, however, departs from his in important ways. First, while
Munkittrick acknowledges that “no single First Amendment theory fully
explains protection of music as speech,”92 his work places a stronger
emphasis on the role of music in the democratic order than is warranted.
Second, this Article more specifically distinguishes and identifies the
different expressive possibilities of instrumental music, which is a
necessary predicate to understanding how free speech theory can be
mapped onto instrumental music.
This summary is necessarily abbreviated and does not touch on every
aspect of the prior scholarship. To the extent that past work is helpful in
thinking about instrumental music, I have integrated it further into the
discussions in Parts II and III. While I draw on this scholarship to the
extent that examining coverage of the visual arts indisputably raises
concerns that overlap with music, this Article argues that the
consideration of instrumental music as speech has some very different
implications as well, and that these are worthy of independent analysis.
C. Instrumental Music Censorship
A logical, initial reaction to the lack of either serious judicial or
academic treatment of the question of instrumental music as speech
might be that it simply doesn’t matter. Beyond a few rare examples,
music censorship has occurred relatively infrequently in American
society. To the extent that it has arisen, it has focused on the lyrical,
rather than musical, component of the expression.93 The need to examine
the grounds for its protection may therefore not be perceived as urgent.
But calls for control and regulation of instrumental music have
spanned millennia and have emerged from all parts of the world, from
both government entities and other powerful institutions. Plato
associated certain forms of music with licentiousness and warned about
the negative impact of music on character.94 In medieval Europe, for
many years the Catholic Church banned a note known as the tritone, an
augmented fourth or diminished fifth note in the Western musical scale,
because its dissonant sound evoked evil.95 The Church even labeled it the

91. Id. at 674–85.
92. Id. at 668.
93. See, e.g., Luke Records, Inc. v. Navarro, 960 F.2d 134, 135–36 (11th Cir. 1992).
94. See 1 Plato, The Republic bk. IV, at 424 (Benjamin Jowett trans., Oxford University Press
3d ed. 1908) (c. 380 B.C.E.).
95. Finlo Rohrer, The Devil’s Music, BBC News Mag. (Apr. 28, 2006, 3:19 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/4952646.stm.
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Devil’s Interval.96 In 1322, Pope John XXII “issued a decree that banned
the usage of descant (improvised high melodic lines) in church
services.”97 And in a widely known, though perhaps not completely
understood, example of “populist censorship” of instrumental work, the
1913 debut of Stravinsky’s “The Rite of Spring” was met with a hostile
audience reaction that resulted in a major public disturbance.98 As
described by one account, “[t]he altercation, which escalated into a riot
that spilled out into the streets (and featured the rare sight of batonwielding gendarmes thumping the heads of uptown arts patrons), was
reportedly sparked by an audience shocked by the musical piece’s then
unheard of, and therefore extremely unsettling, rhythms.”99
In Nazi Germany, Hitler’s regime banned the publication, sale,
performance, and broadcast of “Entartete Musik” (degenerate music).100
Through its Reichsmusikkammer (Reich Chamber of Musical Affairs),
the government systematically excluded Jewish performers and
composers from nearly all aspects of German musical life.101 Among the
notable composers whose work was banned by the Nazis as degenerate
were Stravinsky, Mahler, and Gershwin. Jewish composers, such as
Mendelssohn, were specifically targeted for censorship as well, as was
jazz music, quite probably because of its association with African
Americans.102 The Nazis also engaged in a form of cultural apartheid,
forbidding the performance of works by Jewish composers, except in the
context of events sponsored by the Kulturbund (Jewish Cultural
League), while at the same time forbidding Jews to perform the work of
non-Jewish German composers.103 Similarly, a long history of music
censorship marks several periods of the Soviet regime in the twentieth
century, including, most notably, the regulation of the work of
Shostakovich.104 The Soviet government censored instrumental music for
religious, nationalist, and political reasons. It kept close tabs on music for
fear that it would be decadently bourgeois, class hostile, or religious.105
Moreover, in contemporary cultures, particularly those with
sectarian-dominated government regimes, censorship of instrumental
music is common. Though there is wide disagreement about the role of

96. Id.
97. Peter Blecha, Taboo Tunes: A History of Banned Bands and Censored Songs 15–16 (2004).
98. Id. at 16.
99. Id. (emphasis added). As some have observed, however, it is not entirely clear whether the
audience’s reaction was because they were upset about what the music communicated or because they
did not understand it at all. See Wright, supra note 13, at 1247 n.169.
100. Levi, supra note 9, at 86.
101. Haas, supra note 9, at 226.
102. Levi, supra note 9, at 120; Kozinn, supra note 9.
103. Haas, supra note 9, at 231–35.
104. Green, supra note 9, at 590; Mirovalev, supra note 9.
105. Green, supra note 9, at 590.
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music in Islam, the previously Taliban-controlled Afghanistan106 and the
current Iranian government107 banned instrumental music because of its
association with non-puritanical values and lifestyles and alcohol or drug
use. Similar sectarian-driven animosity from an Islamist rebel group in
northern Mali led to the cancellation in 2013 of the Festival au Désert, a
world famous music celebration.108 As reported by those involved with
past Festivals, the rebels targeted what they viewed as “Satan’s music”
including not only Western music but also “local music styles deemed
offensive to the standards of Shariah, or Islamic law, that were being
imposed on a traditionally tolerant and multicultural society.”109 Among
the local genres of music that were censored was music produced by
tindé drums, usually performed by female ensembles.110 Rebels
threatened musicians’ lives if they performed and destroyed their
instruments and equipment.111
An informal ban on the performance of Wagner’s work persisted for
decades in Israel as well.112 The ban was widely embraced based on
claims of Wagner’s anti-Semitism and his association with the Nazi
regime, though that regime arose well after his death.113 For many Israeli
Jews, Wagner’s compositions bore strong associations with the
Holocaust.114
While less widespread or frequent, several examples of
governmental or other institutional restrictions on the musical
component of expression exist even in the United States. In just the past
few years, two public school districts have been sued, albeit
unsuccessfully, for restricting purely instrumental musical performances
at school programs and ceremonies because of the music’s religious
affiliations.115 In Nurre116 student musicians claimed, among other things,
that the school’s ban on their selected performance violated their free
speech rights.117 They had chosen to play an instrumental version of
Franz Biebl’s “Ave Maria” because “they believed [it] showcased their
talent and the culmination of their instrumental work.”118 Nonetheless,

106. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
107. Tait, supra note 10.
108. Larry Rohter, Musical Nomads, Escaping Political Upheaval, N.Y. Times, July 30, 2013, at C1.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Munkittrick, supra note 4, at 673–74.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Stratechuk v. Bd. of Educ., 587 F.3d 597, 610 (3d Cir. 2009); Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d
1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 2009).
116. Nurre, 580 F.3d 1087.
117. Id. at 1091.
118. Id.
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fearing that the school district would receive complaints about the
religious content of the music, and wanting to appear neutral toward
religion for both Establishment Clause and political purposes, officials
banned the performance, an action upheld by the Ninth Circuit.119 In a
similar case, Stratechuk,120 the Third Circuit upheld a ban on the
performance of holiday music with religious themes, including
instrumental works, at school programs.121
Other examples dot the constitutional landscape as well. A
successful federal obscenity prosecution in the 1960s targeted two
phonograph records, one of which, according to one Supreme Court
Justice, contained material that was made up “almost entirely of the
sounds of percussion instruments”122 (perhaps the first documented
historical ban on aural sex).
Nongovernmental institutions that control forums for musical
expression have also played a censoring role. For example, in 1959,
federally licensed American radio stations refused to broadcast the
purely instrumental Link Wray song, “Rumble,” based on its title’s
association with street violence.123 The BBC banned the broadcast of the
instrumental theme song from the Frank Sinatra movie, The Man with
the Golden Arm, because of its connection to a film about drug abuse.124
And a major retail chain in the Pacific Northwest affixed an “explicit
lyrics” warning label similar to the type sponsored by the RIAA to all
copies of the Frank Zappa album, Jazz from Hell, even though the album
was comprised entirely of instrumental music.125
These instances of instrumental music censorship naturally lead to
important questions about what exactly is being censored. This inquiry,
in turn, leads to a critical examination about the communicative meaning
of instrumental music, which is addressed in Part III.

II. The Uneasy Fit Between Instrumental Music and
Free Speech Doctrine and Theory
Despite the general assumption that instrumental music is
constitutionally protected speech, important and unanswered questions
119. Id.
120. 587 F.3d 597 (3d Cir. 2009).
121. Id. at 610. The plaintiffs challenged the school’s policies as violating both the free speech
clause and Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
122. United States v. Davis, 353 F.2d 614 (2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 953 (1966) (Stewart,
J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). Apparently, Justice Stewart knew it when he heard it (or
didn’t). Cf. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring) (articulating Justice
Stewart’s well known struggle to define hard-core pornography by the subjective factor “I know it
when I see it”).
123. Bernstein, supra note 7.
124. Horsfield, supra note 7.
125. Nuzum, supra note 7, at 254–55.
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remain. As this Part will discuss, the dominant utilitarian theories of free
speech, which justify protection based on the goal of promoting
democratic self-governance and facilitating the search for “truth” by
ensuring a free marketplace of all ideas (not just political ones), do not
adequately explain constitutional protection for music, except at the
broadest levels of abstraction. A partial explanation may emerge under
the truth-seeking theory, however, if music is understood as advancing
non-ideational aspects of truth. Free speech theory based on promoting
dignitary interests, such as individual self-realization and autonomy, offer
a much better match, but make it difficult to distinguish music from other
forms of human liberty protected by the Constitution.
As a quick disclaimer, I should say that my aim here is not to
embrace one free speech theory over another or argue that one is superior
as a unifying principle than the others. Rather, my less ambitious goal,
accepting that each of these theories provides a plausible theoretical
foundation for protecting speech,126 is to examine how well any of these
justifications support the conclusion that instrumental music is and ought
to be constitutionally protected.127
A. Promoting Democratic Self-Governance
Perhaps the most widely discussed and accepted theory underlying
the constitutional protection of speech identifies freedom of expression
as a means of promoting a healthy, transparent, and effective democratic
system of governance. Earlier scholarly proponents of this theory include
Alexander Meiklejohn, whose work argued that the First Amendment is
designed,
to give to every voting member of the body politic the fullest possible
participation in the understanding of those problems with which the
citizens of a self-governing society must deal . . . The primary purpose
of the First Amendment is, then, that all the citizens shall, so far as
possible, understand the issues which bear upon our common life.128

In its original iteration, consistent with his emphasis on promoting
democracy, Meiklejohn’s speech theory distinguished between public
discourse, which he viewed as protected by the First Amendment, and
private communication, which he deemed as governed by the Due
Process Clause.129 Meiklejohn’s narrow focus on democratic self-rule was
126. These are not the only theories of free speech, but they are the most commonly invoked by
both legal scholars and the courts. For a brief discussion of some other speech theories, see Geoffrey
R. Stone et al., Constitutional Law 1026–27 (6th ed. 2009).
127. Not all legal theorists agree that utilitarian, “constructivist,” or consequentialist approaches
are useful to understanding free speech. See, e.g., Larry Alexander, Is There a Right of Freedom of
Expression? 127–34 (2005); Andrew Koppelman, Veil of Ignorance: Tunnel Constructivism in Free
Speech Theory, 107 Nw. U. L. Rev. 647 (2013).
128. Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and Its Relation to Self-Government 88–89 (1948).
129. Id. at 94.
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criticized by, among others, Zechariah Chafee, who pointed out that
Meiklejohn’s theory meant that the First Amendment did not protect
“art and literature.”130 Chafee found it “shocking to deprive these vital
matters” of protection under the speech clause.131
Meiklejohn’s rejoinder to this criticism required him to rethink his
original position on artistic expression under the First Amendment. In
later work, he took the view that literature and “the arts” fell within the
First Amendment’s protection because they were included within the
forms of communication “from which the voter derives the knowledge,
intelligence, sensitivity to human values: the capacity for sane and
objective judgment which, so far as possible, a ballot should express.”132
Elaborating on this, he observed that literature and the arts “are protected
because they have a ‘social importance’ which [he] called a ‘governing’
importance.”133 But Meiklejohn does not mention music in particular,
and it is unclear from his conclusions about the arts whether he would view
nonverbal artistic expression, such as instrumental music, as advancing
these same values. Indeed, the examples he gave involve verbal media,
such as novels, which can be much more directly connected to
democracy.134
In later work, Robert Bork took a much narrower view of speech
and democracy more in line with Meiklejohn’s earlier work. He
concluded that “[c]onstitutional protection should be accorded only to
speech that is explicitly political.”135 “There is no basis,” he explained,
“for judicial intervention to protect any other form of expression, be it
scientific, literary or that variety of expression we call obscene or
pornographic.”136 For Bork, this boundary was essential to ensuring that
First Amendment law advances the principal objective of “‘the discovery
and spread of political truth.’”137 But he rejected the idea that artistic
expression facilitated democratic goals.
I agree that there is an analogy between criticism of official behavior
and the publication of a novel like Ulysses, for the latter may form
attitudes that ultimately affect politics. But it is an analogy, not an
identity. Other human activities and experiences also form personality,
teach and create attitudes just as much as does the novel, but no one
130. Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Book Review, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 891, 900 (1949).
131. Id.
132. See Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. Ct. Rev. 245,
256; see also Harry Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on “The Central Meaning of the First
Amendment”, 1964 Sup. Ct. Rev. 191, 221.
133. Meiklejohn, supra note 132, at 262.
134. Professor Hamilton’s work adheres to the notion that art is expression because, in its own
way, it promotes democracy, and in this way, importantly elaborates on Meiklejohn’s arguably
boundless extension of his democracy-facilitating theory. See generally Hamilton, supra note 3.
135. Bork, supra note 11, at 20.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 24 (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)).
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would on that account, I take it, suggest that the [F]irst [A]mendment
strikes down regulations of economic activity, control of entry into a
trade, laws about sexual behavior, marriage and the like. Yet these
activities, in their capacity to create attitudes that ultimately impinge
upon the political process, are more like literature and science than
literature and science are like political speech.138

Even more advanced forms of democratic theory arguably do not do
the work necessary to support a strong claim for protecting instrumental
music. Contemporary theorists embrace the self-governance promoting
foundations of the First Amendment, but like Meiklejohn struggle with
the dilemma that this theory presents for artistic expression. Robert Post
argues for a broader understanding of the democratic self-governance
theory that ensures not simply informed decisionmaking about
candidates and issues, but also protects the process of forming public
opinion, “which is understood as a form of communicative action.”139 His
theory calls for the protection not of speech per se, but of “those speech
acts and media of communication that are socially regarded as necessary
and proper means of participating in the formation of public opinion,”
which Post calls “public discourse.”140 “The function of public discourse
is to enable persons to experience the value of self-government.”141
According to Post, self-governance theory is properly understood in
relation to its protection of individual autonomy and self-determination
in the formation of opinion related to the democratic process.142
Post claims that his theory is capacious enough to include protection
for artistic expression. He writes:
Public discourse includes all communicative processes deemed
necessary for the formation of public opinion. Art and other forms of
noncognitive, nonpolitical speech fit comfortably within the scope of
public discourse. Public discourse depends upon the maintenance of a
public sphere, which is a sociological structure that is a prerequisite to
the formation of public opinion.143

Even with his broad understanding of public opinion, however, it is not
obvious how instrumental musical expression is “necessary” to its
understanding. Said differently, Post suggests that to be subject to the
First Amendment’s coverage, artistic expression “need not concern
potential policy decisions; it need only contribute to what people think
when they communicate to each other in public.”144 Perhaps what he is

138. Id. at 27.
139. Robert Post, Participatory Democracy and Free Speech, 97 Va. L. Rev. 477, 483 (2011).
140. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 486.
144. Robert Post, Participatory Democracy as a Theory of Free Speech: A Reply, 97 Va. L. Rev.
617, 621 (2011).

Chen-66.2.doc (Do Not Delete)

406

3/21/2015 4:21 PM

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 66:381

suggesting is that art must be protected because to fail to do so would
undermine the very legitimacy of democratic governance; but that would
seem to be true of many other forms of communication, not all of which
are protected. And it is not at all clear why music or other forms of
nonpropositional expression would contribute to what people “think”
when they communicate to each other in public, or how that contributes
to the public discourse, even broadly defined.145
James Weinstein, who also argues for a democracy-promoting First
Amendment theory, is more skeptical about the conceptual connection
between purely instrumental music and promotion of self-governance.
As he observes, “[p]erhaps its greatest explanatory shortcoming is that a
theory based in participatory democracy cannot easily explain the
rigorous protection that current doctrine affords non-ideational art such
as abstract paintings or symphonic music.”146 Though Weinstein
acknowledges the “plausible” democracy-based explanation that “art in
general can be a particularly effective means of political persuasion,”147
that is not always the case, or even the intention, of musical expression,
and I share his doubt that this adequately explains the rigorous First
Amendment protection that artistic speech presumptively enjoys.
Similarly, as Seana Shiffrin aptly observes:
Although a case could be made that the freedom to compose and to
listen to Stravinsky is important to developing the sort of open
personal and cultural character necessary for democracy to flourish or
that it feeds the “sociological structure that is prerequisite for the
formation of public opinion,” that justification is strained and bizarrely
indirect. In any case, the right of Stravinsky to compose and of
audiences to listen (or to cringe in non-comprehension) should not
depend upon whether The Rite of Spring breeds democrats or fascists,
or whether it supports, detracts from, or is superfluous to a democratic
culture.148

As suggested earlier, Munkittrick’s commentary on music and
speech relies heavily, though not exclusively, on a democracy-based
rationale. On this ground, he argues that the government actually plays a
necessary role in promoting musical expression to sustain “a minimum
level of diversity in the aesthetic, creative, and emotional decision
making that music enables.”149 He goes on to argue that such diversity is
145. See Koppelman, supra note 127, at 679 (“Democratic legitimation . . . cannot explain the
protection of instrumental music.”); see also Wright, supra note 13, at 1222 (observing that not all
instrumental music expresses an opinion or has a subject).
146. Weinstein, supra note 12, at 499 n.45.
147. Id.
148. Seana Valentine Shiffrin, A Thinker-Based Approach to Freedom of Speech, 27 Const.
Comment. 283, 285–86 (2011) (emphasis added) (citation omitted); See C. Edwin Baker, Autonomy and
Free Speech, 27 Const. Comment. 251, 271 (2011) (“[C]ompositional music . . . require[s] a stretch to
justify as political speech.”).
149. Munkittrick, supra note 4, at 682–83.
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essential to ensuring that the democratic functions of music are not
impaired.150 In advancing this view, he suggests that instrumental music is
central to political life.151 But the examples he draws on to illustrate that
music can act as “direct political speech” do not involve pure musical
expression, but the appropriation of music for its performers’ specific
goals.152 That is, his arguments are premised more on the association of
music with particular events or historical contexts, not on the inherent
expressive function of the music itself. As I argue below, however,
associative claims are not really about the music; they are derivative of
the contexts in which the music is placed, and therefore do not support a
democratic justification for counting music as speech.153
Democratic self-governance theory is typically operationalized,
however imperfectly, through doctrinal devices, primarily the Court’s
articulation of a heavy presumption against regulations that discriminate
based on the viewpoint or content of speech.154 Even if we are to accept
the democracy-promoting value of musical expression, it is difficult to
imagine how this doctrine would be implemented to evaluate the
constitutionality of music regulation. What would the application of
viewpoint or content discrimination look like? It is doubtful whether
instrumental music, unlike music with lyrics, can ever be said to have a
specific viewpoint.155 Even if it could, it would not likely be a political
viewpoint or one that would contribute, directly or indirectly, to the
flourishing of democracy. This is why Meiklejohn and others have
struggled to defend artistic expression under the democratic theory. That
is not to say that governments have not attempted to censor instrumental
music because of its political associations, or rather because of their
perceptions of its political meaning. But it would be an odd application
of First Amendment doctrine, though perhaps not an entirely
inappropriate one, if courts applied strict scrutiny to government
suppression of music because of its perceived political content or
viewpoint where the composer or performer had no such intent.
An easier case can be made that different types of instrumental
music bear different content, and that the government might discriminate
based on that content. Content discrimination might come in the form of
discrimination against particular genres of music (classical music is ok,
rap and hip-hop are not) or matters of taste (allowing performance of only
“good” or “artistic” music, but not bad music). Indeed, the Fact Concerts

150. Id. at 683.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 683–84.
153. See infra notes 195–209 and accompanying text.
154. But see Baker, supra note 148, at 278–80 (arguing that the content discrimination doctrine
actually reflects the Court’s invocation of an autonomy-based rationale).
155. Greenman, supra note 13, at 1348; Munkittrick, supra note 4, at 676–77.
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case is an example of precisely that type of genre discrimination.156 But
again, the implications for democratic self-rule in protecting speech from
such restrictions are unclear. The hypothetical regulations here might be
viewed as matters of taste, but participation in public discourse has never
turned on whether one’s musical taste is elegant or tacky. Without taking
a broad view of democracy that encompasses all forms of thought or
feeling about all subjects, it is difficult to justify protection of
instrumental music under this theory.
In the end, democratic self-governance is at best an incomplete
theory for protecting instrumental music, and at worst simply unhelpful.
That is not to say that democracy-based speech theory is not one of the
justifications for constitutional protection of speech. But this Article
argues that promoting democracy is a conditionally sufficient,157 but not
necessary, reason for protecting different forms of expression.
B. Facilitating the Search for Truth
A second dominant theory for protecting speech is the idea that
expressive freedom promotes the search for more general truths beyond
the world of politics and governing. Derived from the writings of John
Milton and John Stuart Mill, this justification is premised on the
conception of a broader understanding of truth than is democratic selfgovernance theory. Most important, their conceptions of truth are about
the truth of ideas, not historical or factual truth. Thus, Milton argued that
freedom in the communication of ideas was essential to promote
“discovery” of ideas that might be developed in “religious and civil
wisdom.”158 Similarly, Mill claimed that protection of opinion was crucial
to liberty because whether the ideas expressed in an opinion are “true”
or “false,” widely held or marginal, society can only understand truth by
a full consideration of all opinions.159 Neither Milton nor Mill, however,
limited the consideration of ideas and opinions to those directly
grounded in democracy.
Facilitation of the search for truth is most frequently associated with
Justice Holmes’s dissent in Abrams v. United States, in which the Court
upheld the defendants’ convictions under the Espionage Act for
conspiring to “unlawfully utter, print, write and publish,” among other
things, “disloyal, scurrilous and abusive language about the form of
government of the United States” and language intended to bring that
156. City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 250–51 (1981) (examining city’s cancellation
of permit to perform because the scheduled band was a rock group rather than a jazz group).
157. What I mean by “conditionally sufficient” is that expression ought to be protected because it
facilitates self-governance, but that not all expression is protected because it is political, for example
politically motivated property destruction or violence.
158. John Milton, Areopagitica 4 (1644).
159. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 82–83 (2d ed. 1859).
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form of government into “contempt, scorn, contumely, and disrepute.”160
As he wrote, “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market.”161 Of course, the search
for truth substantially overlaps with the promotion of self-governance.162
However, it has been widely conceived as understanding truth in a more
general sense of social enlightenment that is not limited to opinions
about government or public policy.
What types of truths might be generated by free speech that are not
at least somewhat linked to self-governance, or at least are not inherently
linked to democracy? Certainly religious or spiritual truths, to the extent
they inform personal and collective understandings of the universe,
might fall within this category. In addition, matters of science or morality
may fall within a broad understanding of areas in which unregulated
discourse is important to produce a better truth through the evolution of
ideas. And, as I argue later, cultural truths ought to be included as well.
The logical progression to conclude that instrumental music is a part
of this discourse, however, is still somewhat difficult to navigate. Even
these nonpolitical, non-democracy-facilitating areas of inquiry are
typically engaged in through propositional verbal expression that appeals
to cognitive reasoning. Governmental interference with nonverbal
musical expression distorts the marketplace of ideas only if instrumental
music conveys or is understood as an idea. But others observe,
convincingly, that musical expressions are not part of “ideational” or
ideaist way of communicating. Under truth-based theories, the First
Amendment might not apply to forms of expression that do not serve to
protect the communication and reception of information and ideas. As
John Greenman observes:
[W]e can say that “information” is used to refer to things like
sentences, mathematical formulas, musical scores, computer code, and
DNA strings. But it is not used to refer to things like the sound of
music or the way a picture looks. “Idea,” on the other hand, refers to
mostly the same things—sentences, formulas, scores, and so forth—
with the added requirement that “idea” usually connotes a mental
phenomenon.163

Edwin Baker similarly suggests that:
[A]ll aesthetic experiences, like all experiences generally, can affect
who a person is, how she sees the world, and thereby affect her values,
politics, and notions of truth. Such explanations for their relevance to
the political sphere or to a marketplace of ideas do not, however,

160. 250 U.S. 616, 616–17 (1919).
161. Id. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
162. See Eugene Volokh, In Defense of the Marketplace of Ideas/Search for Truth as a Theory of
Free Speech Protection, 97 Va. L. Rev. 595, 595 (2011).
163. Greenman, supra note 13, at 1348 (emphasis added); see also Weinstein, supra note 12, at 499
n.45 (describing symphonic music as non-ideational art).
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distinguish them from, say, hiking in a wilderness area, cooperation in
a barn raising, or engaging in a criminal enterprise.164

As with the democratic self-governance theory, the search for truth is
implemented through general doctrinal rules forbidding viewpoint and
other content discrimination. The rationale for prohibiting such
discrimination is the prevention of government distortion of the
marketplace. Because truth finding is a function of complete and open
discourse, any state interference with the landscape of opinion
jeopardizes the search for truth.165 To the extent that the market is one of
ideas, information, opinion, or other appeals to cognitive reasoning (even
if the objective is not factual truth or political truth, but something moral,
scientific, literary, and even spiritual), government regulation of
instrumental music would not appear to affect the search for truth in any
meaningful way. If that is the case, the truth rationale, without more, is
not an adequate explanation for the protection of music as speech. A
more complete understanding of how instrumental music may advance
certain kinds of truths, however, may cause us to reevaluate this skepticism.
C. Promoting Individual Autonomy and Self-Fulfillment
A third compelling claim for protecting speech is grounded in
promoting individual autonomy. Many scholars have articulated the
autonomy justifications for freedom of expression, though with varied
approaches to defining autonomy. Scanlon examines the notion of
autonomy in terms of the individual’s freedom to engage in selfdetermination.166 State interference with the ability to experience the
universe of competing ideas seriously compromises such autonomy. As
he famously wrote:
An autonomous person cannot accept without independent
consideration the judgment of others as to what he should believe or
what he should do. He may rely on the judgment of others, but when
he does so he must be prepared to advance independent reasons for
thinking their judgment likely to be correct, and to weigh the evidential
value of their opinion against contrary evidence.167

A regime under which the government could regulate the free
conveyance of such opinions or judgments, therefore, is inconsistent with
each person’s autonomy to form beliefs about her course of thought or
164. Baker, supra note 148, at 271–72.
165. This is, of course, setting aside the many legitimate concerns about whether the speech
marketplace, any more than the economic marketplace, is completely competitive and that all
participants have equal resources and information. See generally Sunstein, supra note 76.
166. Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 204, 216 (1972)
[hereinafter Scanlon, Theory]. In later work, Scanlon modified his views about speech and autonomy.
See generally T.M. Scanlon, Jr., Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U. Pitt. L.
Rev. 519 (1979).
167. Scanlon, Theory, supra note 166, at 216.
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action. An important distinction of this version of the autonomy theory,
then, is that it emphasizes the value of speech to the individual as much
as to the collective interest in a functioning democracy or the societal
achievement of truth.
Martin Redish argues for a broader, refined version of this theory,
suggesting that the free speech clause serves the value of “individual selfrealization.”168 In elaborating on this idea, he explains that self-realization,
can be interpreted to refer either to development of the individual’s
powers and abilities—an individual ‘realizes’ his or her full potential—
or to the individual’s control of his or her own destiny through making
life-affecting decisions—an individual ‘realizes’ the goals in life that he
or she has set.169

Redish claims that his theory constitutes a stronger approach to speech
protection in part because the objectives of other theories (promoting
democracy, the search for truth) are largely subsumed within the promotion
of self-realization.
Baker spent much of his life examining and refining autonomybased theories of free speech.170 In his later work, he grounded his
autonomy theory in the concept of legitimacy. He argues that “a legitimate
legal order must fully respect (among other things, e.g. equality) both
individual and collective autonomy—both non-political and political
speech.”171 He elaborates:
If the moral value of democracy lies (in part) in its contribution to
people’s political autonomy in pursuit of their democratically chosen
projects—with its implicit premise that it values these people as
autonomous—democracy’s authority should be limited by this same
value. Given this value, democracy (or law) should not, therefore, be
authorized to enact laws that disrespect, that are premised on the
propriety of denying, a person’s autonomy (or, though less relevant
here, her equality and maybe her dignity). This conclusion should then
guide interpretation of the constitutional guarantee of free speech. It
gives equal status to protecting speech as a part of personal, individual
self-government and as an aspect of her participation in collective selfgovernment.172

Critics of Baker and other autonomy theorists have made several
claims. Among them is the concern that autonomy is a justification not
only for expressive freedom but also for myriad other types of individual
liberty that are clearly not constitutionally protected. As Bork observed,
[D]evelopment of individual faculties and the achievement of
pleasure . . . do not distinguish speech from any other human activity.

168. Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. Pa. L. Rev. 591, 593 (1982) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
169. Id.
170. See generally C. Edwin Baker, Human Liberty and Freedom of Speech (1992).
171. Baker, supra note 148, at 266.
172. Id. at 266–67.

Chen-66.2.doc (Do Not Delete)

412

3/21/2015 4:21 PM

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 66:381

An individual may develop his faculties or derive pleasure from trading
on the stock market, following his profession as a river port pilot,
working as a barmaid, engaging in sexual activity, playing tennis,
rigging prices or in any of thousands of other endeavors.173

Essentially, this critique suggests that autonomy-based justifications have
no limiting principle. But as Baker and others point out, of course, one
limiting principle is the First Amendment, which specifically establishes
an expression-specific form of liberty, distinctive of other liberties, protected
and not.174 While many other acts may lead to self-realization or fulfillment,
they are mostly not expressive or communicative, and are covered, if at all,
by other aspects of the Constitution.175
Shiffrin more recently has articulated a “thinker-based” approach to
autonomy and speech. In developing her theory, she identifies eight
separate, sometimes overlapping, interests in which the rational thinker
should enjoy autonomy: capacity for practical and theoretical thought;
apprehending the true; exercising the imagination; becoming a distinct
individual; moral agency; responding authentically; living among others;
and appropriate recognition and treatment.176 As she notes, “[s]peech,
and free speech in particular, are necessary conditions of the realization
of these interests.”177 Her version of an autonomy theory suggests that
each of these values is appropriately advanced by a free speech doctrine,
and explains how they can be used to justify speech that does not fall
comfortably under the umbrella of the promotion of democracy or the
search for truth:
Communication of the contents of one’s mind primarily through
linguistic means, but also through pictorial or even musical
representation, uniquely furthers the interest in being known by others.
It thereby also makes possible complex forms of social life. Further, it
helps to develop some of the capacities prerequisite to moral agency
because successful communication demands having a sense of what
others are in a position to know and understand. Practicing

173. Bork, supra note 11, at 25; see also Tushnet, supra note 3, at 205–06 (“Autonomy-related
theories are . . . problematic as a way to distinguish artistic expression from essentially all other human
activities, which can be ways in which people live autonomously.”).
174. Baker, supra note 148, at 256–57; Redish, supra note 168, at 600 (“[T]hat the framers deemed
it necessary to create a first amendment at all, rather than merely including speech within the other
forms of liberty protected by the fifth amendment, indicates that speech is to receive a constitutional
status above and beyond that given to conduct.”).
175. There are easier and harder cases that fall within this group, however. Sexual conduct may be
a tougher example to distinguish, since sex can have an important expressive component. See
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003); cf. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969) (finding,
under an autonomy theory, that the private observation of legally obscene material in one’s home was
protected by the First Amendment).
176. Shiffrin, supra note 148, at 289–90.
177. Id. at 291.
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communication initiates the process of taking others’ perspective to
understand what others know and are in a position to grasp.178

She adds:
Pictorial representations and music (and not merely discourse about
them) should also gain foundational protection because they also
represent the externalization of mental contents, contents that may not
be accurately or well-captured through linguistic means; after all, not
all thoughts are discursive or may be fully captured through discursive
description.179

The Supreme Court has forcefully, though rarely, based free speech
claims on autonomy arguments. Perhaps the clearest example of this is in
Stanley v. Georgia.180 In Stanley, the Court overturned the conviction of
a man who was charged with possession of obscene films in the privacy of
his own home.181 The Court embraced the defendant’s First Amendment
claim that he had the right to determine what material he watched, even
if that material could otherwise be regulated, or even prohibited.182 In his
opinion for the Court, Justice Marshall wrote:
If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no
business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he
may read or what films he may watch. Our whole constitutional
heritage rebels at the thought of giving government the power to
control men’s minds.183

Similarly, it is possible to conceptualize a First Amendment analysis of
instrumental music under an autonomy-based theory.
Indeed, like Baker, Redish, and Shiffrin, I agree that some form of
autonomy justification is one of the strongest theoretical foundations for
constitutional protection of instrumental music. Shiffrin, in particular,
articulates a position that broadens the scope of autonomy in ways that
could be used to justify protection of instrumental music, while still
maintaining some limiting, if not completely defined, principles that
would not result in arguments to protect everything as expression. But
there are some unanswered questions that require further elaboration.
First, no one has closely examined what it is about instrumental music
that advances autonomy values. In Part III, this Article breaks musical
expression down into its constituent parts and discusses what makes
them distinctly expressive in manners that should be of concern to the
First Amendment. Second, music could be said to advance all of the
theories of free speech if taken at their broadest level of abstraction. If

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.

Id. at 291–92.
Id. at 295.
394 U.S. 557 (1969).
Id. at 568.

Id.
Id. at 565.
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music is protected, what limiting principles exist to distinguish it from other
forms of expressive liberty that might not advance those same values?

III. Understanding Instrumental Music as Speech
If instrumental music can be justified under any of the three
dominant theories of free speech protection, its value to the speaker, the
audience, and the collective society must be measured in relation to
those theories. As with all forms of communication, music can be
assessed from the perspective of the speaker (in this case, the composer
and the performer) as well as from the perspective of its audience (for
music, its listeners). For the composer and performer, music must be
understood in terms of its expressive meaning. The value to the listener,
in turn, includes how she thinks about and interprets the music and how
it affects her thoughts and emotions—in short, how the listener
experiences music. Each of these values, in turn, may be influenced by
the distinct melodic and rhythmic elements of musical expression.
A. What Is Distinctive About Instrumental Musical Expression?
A working definition of music is an important starting point. All
musical instruments convey sound by creating vibrations that are
transmitted through the air and internally processed by listeners’
eardrums.184 But of course all sound is processed this way, whether it is
verbal language, music, or a thunder clap. It seems that every generation
stereotypically views the next generation’s popular music as so much
noise. So, what are the distinctive factors that make something music and
not noise?185 The Oxford English Dictionary definition of music is “[t]he
art or science of combining vocal or instrumental sounds with a view to
beauty or coherence of form and expression of emotion.”186 The formal
definition is therefore based on some kind of intentionality to make
sounds in a manner designed to do more than make noise. But it also,
importantly, envisions aesthetic values of beauty and emotion.187

184. See Miller v. Civil City of S. Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1125–26 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J.,
dissenting) (“All music is rhythmic pressure on the eardrum. Mozart’s string quartets, jackhammers,
and humpback whales all produce rhythmic compressions.”), rev’d sub nom. Barnes v. Glen Theatre,
Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
185. Indeed, the freedom from sound or noise can also promote important values of autonomy.
See generally Tamara R. Piety, Brandishing the First Amendment: Commercial Expression in
America (2012); George Prochnik, Op-Ed., I’m Thinking. Please. Be Quiet., N.Y. Times, Aug. 25,
2013, at 4.
186. Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles 1866 (William R. Trumble
et al. eds., 5th ed. 2002).
187. I will set aside, for now, questions about whether there are important differences between
popular music and music as a fine art because they are not germane to my main discussion.
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Expressing the Inexpressible

One possible dilemma in defining the speech value of instrumental
music is that it is sometimes said to be capable of conveying expression in
a manner that may not be achievable through language (as the Huxley
quote in the epigraph in the Introduction suggests). Indeed, as John
Dewey aptly observed:
If all meanings could be adequately expressed by words, the arts of
painting and music would not exist. There are values and meanings
that can be expressed only by immediately visible and audible qualities,
and to ask what they mean in the sense of something that can be put
into words is to deny their distinctive existence.188

Similarly, in his critique of the notion that only speech that conveys
information or ideas ought to be protected by the First Amendment,
Greenman writes “[i]f instrumental music conveys ideas, then more or
less everything must.”189 The challenge is whether these descriptions
prove too much. That is, if music expresses something that cannot be
reduced to language, then why, if at all, ought it be protected by the
freedom of speech? This is one of the questions I explore below.

2.

Music Compared to Other Arts

A different, but also reasonable, preliminary question is whether
instrumental music is any different from other forms of nonverbal art,
such as painting, sculpture, or dancing.190 There are certainly similarities
that bear mention. First, in the case of instrumental music as well as
painting and sculpture, the composer, painter, or sculptor may have the
intent to communicate a specific idea, emotion, or concept, or she may
have no intent at all except to create something beautiful, interesting, or
entertaining, and thereby worth looking at or listening to.
Another similarity is that in the case of all three arts, the expression
may be open to multiple, varying, and even conflicting interpretations by
the audience. This, too, presents something of a challenge for fitting
them into speech theory because if there is not an objective, or at least
widely understood, meaning attributable to the expression, it is hard to
figure out how it can be classified as speech under the standard doctrine.
For example, if there is no accepted understanding of the message or
idea expressed in an artistic work, how would we know when the
government was engaging in content or viewpoint discrimination?

188. John Dewey, Art as Experience 74 (1934).
189. Greenman, supra note 13, at 1348.
190. I set aside verbal forms of artistic expression such as literature and poetry for the same
reasons that I do not address musical lyrics.
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An important factor that sets instrumental music apart from
painting or sculpture, however, is that music is necessarily dynamic in
two ways. All art must begin with its creation. For music, the creation is
by the composer, for painting the painter, and for sculpture the sculptor.
But once a painting or sculpture is completed (in most cases, setting
aside certain forms of interactive or performance art), the conduct is
complete. Even if different audiences view and understand the work in
myriad ways, the artwork is itself static. A composer creates music, but
music involves a second stage of conduct in its performance, which is
dynamic. As Dewey described:
Music, having sounds as its medium, thus necessarily expresses in a
concentrated way the shocks and instabilities, the conflicts and
resolutions, that are the dramatic changes enacted upon the more
enduring background of nature and human life. The tension and the
struggle has its gatherings of energy, its discharges, its attacks and
defenses, its mighty warrings and its peaceful meetings, its resistances
and resolutions, and out of these things music weaves its web. It is thus
at the opposite pole from the sculptural. As one expresses the
enduring, the stable and universal, so the other expresses stir, agitation,
movement, the particulars and contingencies of existences—which,
nevertheless, are as ingrained in nature and as typical in experience as
are its structural permanences.191

But it is not only the dynamism of the specific musical performance
that distinguishes instrumental music from other forms of art. In
addition, unlike other nonrepresentational art forms, instrumental music
is capable of being created, performed, and reperformed and
reinterpreted anew on repeated, potentially infinite, occasions.192 Each
performance may convey the expression in a unique manner and be
interpreted in a universe of ways. The variation in performance is
important because each new performance reproduces the autonomy and
cultural protection arguments potentially justifying First Amendment
protection.193
One could take these latter points to support the idea that music
expresses in a different way than painting or sculpture. But dance can
also be performed and interpreted by each new dancer and is equally
dynamic in both senses. To be sure, while there are strong connections
between dance and music (including the fact that most dance is
performed to music), there are also differences worth mentioning. And

191. Dewey, supra note 188, at 236.
192. For an interesting account of the multitude of interpretations of one of the most well-known
pieces of classical music, see Matthew Guerrieri, The First Four Notes: Beethoven’s Fifth and the
Human Imagination (2012).
193. See infra Part III.B.2.
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there are factors that distinguish instrumental music from all other art
forms. First, music is the only form of art that is communicated entirely
through auditory means. There are no visual cues or associations to
interpret, no images to look at, no colors, textures, or forms. Second,
instrumental music is the only art form that is always
nonrepresentational. A painting, sculpture, or dance can depict ideas and
images in a literal way or an abstract way, opening the door to inquiries
about whether only those art forms that convey an understandable
message, as the Court suggested in Spence, ought to count as speech.194
The composition and performance of instrumental music can never
convey an idea or thought in a literal sense, and no listener can discern a
literal meaning from hearing such music. Unlike other art forms,
instrumental music can never be propositional, and therefore presents
the purest form of artistic expression for First Amendment theory
purposes. The next Subpart examines the ways in which instrumental
music might be considered expressive.
B. The Specific Communicative Aspects of Instrumental Music
From these foundations, a theory of instrumental music as speech
must build the case for why such music falls within the purposes of the
First Amendment. We have already surveyed the three main theoretical
justifications for music as speech—promoting democratic selfgovernance; advancing the search for truth; and promoting autonomy
(however defined). If we were considering lyrical or vocal music, the
discussion would be simpler because we could examine the lyrics for
their content and discuss how the freedom to engage in those verbal
expressions advanced any of these three main theories. But separating
out the tonal and rhythmic components of musical expression presents
significant theoretical (as well as doctrinal) complexities that neither the
courts nor legal scholars have adequately addressed.
In the following Subparts, this Article discusses five different
possible ways of understanding the communicative component of
instrumental music. The first three are what I categorize as “cognitive
claims,” each of which has power, but none of which ultimately can be
squared with conventional speech theory in a way that is workable in
either a theoretical or a doctrinal sense. The fourth category—music as
an expression of cultural, religious, nationalist, or other social values—
holds greater promise as a type of communication that the First
Amendment ought to cover, even if it cannot be understood to involve
particularized messages. The fifth and final category, which considers

194. See Miller v. Civil City of S. Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1125 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J.,
dissenting) (“Ballet rarely approaches absolute music in abstraction.”), rev’d sub nom. Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
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music as a powerful conveyor of emotional feeling and sensibility, also
provides a more solid grounding for understanding instrumental music as
speech.

1.

Three Cognitive Claims

As the prior free speech theory discussion and the earlier case law
survey suggest, an important justification for covering expression under
the First Amendment is to promote the conveyance of specific messages,
ideas, beliefs, and thoughts. In its most fundamental form, speech is
about transmitting these things to others, which requires cognitive
engagement. Thus, if instrumental music is “speech,” it is important to
examine the degree to which it might facilitate cognitive reactions in its
listeners. There are three possible ways of thinking about instrumental
music and cognition.

a.

Instrumental Music as Evocative/Associative of
Cognitive Thought

One claim might be that instrumental music, though by definition
nonverbal and nonpropositional (examined more below), nonetheless
provokes meaningful cognitive responses in its listeners. Though music
might not convey a particular message, it may be ultimately generative of
conscious thoughts and ideas in the sense that some music is strongly
associated or evocative of specific ideas or themes that are themselves
defined by social context. I will call this the associative claim.
For example, a purely instrumental work may have a provocative or
controversial title. Though the music itself is targeted by censors, it is not
the musical content per se that is objectionable, but its association with
the work’s title. Thus, as described briefly earlier, the song “Rumble,”
recorded by Link Wray and the Wray Men, was banned by American
radio stations in the late 1950s.195 The explanation provided was that the
song was associated with street violence, which broadcasters were
presumably afraid would be inspired in those who listened to the song.196
Again, although the work was itself purely instrumental, the music itself
was associated with a social problem.
In another incident that may reflect this mode of thinking about
instrumental music, Meyer Music Markets, a chain retailer in the Pacific
Northwest, created a record labeling program modeled on the
controversial efforts of the RIAA.197 The retail chain then required that
its outlets label copies of the Frank Zappa album, Jazz from Hell, with an
“explicit lyrics” sticker, even though the album was comprised entirely of
195. Bernstein, supra note 7.
196. Id.
197. Nuzum, supra note 7, at 39.
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instrumental music.198 The retailer’s labeling committee apparently
assumed that the album must be controversial because Zappa was an
outspoken critic of the RIAA and the Parents Music Resource Center, a
private advocacy group whose founder, Tipper Gore, had strongly
pushed for labeling standards.199 It is also possible that, like the Link
Wray instrumental, Zappa’s album was censored because of the title of
the album itself or because of the titles of some of the album’s individual
instrumental tracks (for example, “G-Spot Tornado”). Another example
is instrumental music that is censored because of its association with a
different art form, such as a motion picture. The BBC banned the
broadcast of the purely instrumental theme song from the Frank Sinatra
movie, The Man with the Golden Arm, because of the song’s connection
to a film about heroin addiction.200
In other instances, purely instrumental music may have specific
communicative qualities that are intended by the performer and widely
understood by the intended audience. For example, southern states banned
African drumming in early American slave cultures during the late 1700s
and early 1800s, because different drumming patterns communicated, and
were understood to communicate, specific and concrete messages, such as
signaling slave rebellions.201
Other music has developed particular meanings within the relevant
community. During World War II, anti-German resistance fighters in
Belgium adopted the letter “V” as their symbol, representing both the
French word for victory (“victoire”) and the Flemish word for freedom
(“vrijheid”).202 Officials at the BBC wanted to use the V symbol in their
broadcasts to demonstrate support for the resistance fighters, and
someone suggested using the Morse code symbol for V, which consists of
three short signals and a long signal.203 BBC officials noticed that the
famous opening of Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony shared the same
cadence as the Morse code symbol for V, and that became their signal to
listeners to alert them to pro-ally broadcasts.204
Yet another example of music that conveys specific ideas or
information is music cryptograms. Cryptograms use sequences of musical
notes to convey messages by associating certain notes with letters of the
alphabet, thus making it possible to hide a verbal message in a musical

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id.
Id. at 24–39.
Horsfield, supra note 7.
Ted Gioia, The History of Jazz 7 (1997); Robert Palmer, Deep Blues 33 (1982).
Guerrieri, supra note 192, at 211.
Id.
Id. at 212–14.
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score.205 Many classical composers, most famously Bach, used
cryptograms to embed family names and other messages into their
compositions.206 There is even some historical evidence of the use of
music cryptograms to carry out espionage or other actions the speakers
hoped to hide from the government.207
Each of these is a possible instance of instrumental music being used
to communicate in ways we might consider worthy of protection under
the First Amendment. Under any of the three major theories—
democracy, truth, or autonomy—one could make the case for protection
of music because it is associated, directly or indirectly, with particularized
messages. The problem with this understanding of music as speech is that
if music is really just a code for verbal expression, then it may not
actually be the musical component of the expression that is
communicative. For example, if an African drum beat or pipe tune is
intended by both performer and listener to convey a specific message—
one that can be reduced to words, such as “help” or “warning”—then
instrumental music in these contexts is really no different from Morse
code. It is a series of beats or notes, rather than dots and dashes, that has
specific and understood linguistic meanings. The same could be said for
cryptograms.208 In this context, while there would be the easiest
justification for categorizing instrumental music as speech, the reasons
actually make music here less conceptually interesting because it is not
really distinct from traditional speech. That is, the problem with this
approach to considering instrumental music as speech is that the very
representational associations the music has may in fact take it out of the
realm of pure instrumental speech.
Moreover, this form of musical expression arguably already might
be covered within an existing doctrinal framework, the law of conduct as
speech. In United States v. O’Brien, the Court held that one of the
factors in determining whether nonverbal conduct may be speech
protected by the First Amendment is whether “the governmental interest
[in regulating that conduct] is unrelated to the suppression of free
expression.”209 Thus, under O’Brien, musical expression is conduct that is
protected only when the government’s interest in regulating it is to
address its speech or cognitive component. Under this doctrine,
205. The Musical Cryptogram, Classical.com, http://www.classical.com/musical-cryptogram (last
visited Feb. 2, 2015).
206. Marcus du Sautoy, The Magic Numbers: A Fascination with Figures Runs Through the Music
of Composers from Mozart to Bach, Guardian, Apr. 5, 2013, at 14; see also Wright, supra note 13, at
1247 & n.170 (suggesting that coded messages, including musical scores, are speech because even
though they may not be generally understandable, they have meaning for their intended audience).
207. The Musical Cryptogram, supra note 205.
208. See Alexander, supra note 127, at 8 (suggesting that it would be difficult to see how sign
language or pictographs could be excluded from the category of speech).
209. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
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explaining protection of instrumental music that conveys an
unambiguous message is a relatively easy task. In the examples discussed
above, the governments or other power holders have attempted to
regulate instrumental music not because of its musical elements, but
because of its cognitive message. But O’Brien permits the government to
regulate the noncognitive, nonverbal part of the conduct if it has a
sufficient interest. Taking away the message-conveying aspect of the
African drumming signals, the conduct is simply the beating of the drum
head surface, which is content-free conduct, like draft card burning. In
fact, O’Brien’s analysis would logically lead to the conclusion that the
musical component of the expression is not protected, or at least that the
speech and conduct cases do not explain constitutional protection for all
instrumental music. For similar reasons, instrumental music that is
censored because it is directly associated with an idea, through its title,
lyrics, or otherwise, can be viewed as more closely linked to an appeal to
an idea or cognitive function, and is unhelpful for understanding the
purer or harder case.

b.

Instrumental Music as Enhancing Other Communicative
Messages

A second conceptualization of the cognitive value of instrumental
music is that the melodic and rhythmic components of musical expression
may sometimes interact in meaningful ways with lyrics or other verbal
messages, combining to express something that is both greater than, and
distinctive from, the lyrics alone. I refer to this as the enhancement claim.
Consider a song that is read out loud, but with no musical accompaniment.
The lyrics would be communicative in their own right. But they might not
convey the ideas or information or sentiments in the same way—with the
same emphases and dynamic tension—that they might if they were sung
with musical accompaniment. Understood in this way, music may
influence the lyrical text in a manner similar to the way that visual images
sometimes enhance verbal messages. As one commentator notes,
[A] number of studies have concluded that texts incorporating visual
images (sometimes referred to as “visuals”) are more effective at
influencing people’s beliefs than texts containing only words (e.g., a
book), sounds (e.g., instrumental music), or even texts combining both
words and sounds (e.g., vocal recordings) . . . . Sound recordings are
the most powerful conveyor of beliefs after visuals.210

The importance of instrumental music in enhancing lyrical expression is
only understood if the musical components are separated out and

210. Claire Wright, Reconciling Cultural Diversity and Free Trade in the Digital Age: A Cultural
Analysis of the International Trade in Content Items, 41 Akron L. Rev. 399, 464–65 n.337 (2008)
(citing Daniel J. Levitin, This is Your Brain on Music: The Science of a Human Obsession (2006)).
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determined to have a communicative impact independent of, or more
accurately, supplementing, the vocal elements of a performance.
If music has an identifiable speech-enhancing component that
influences verbal expression in an independent, meaningful way, then
protection of instrumental music can be justified on the grounds that it
promotes self-governance, the search for truth, and self-realization. We
might view with skepticism the censorship of an overtly political song
whose message is enhanced by its musical elements because of the resulting
interference with democratic self-governance. Consider, for example, the
difference in inspirational meaning derived from singing a protest song
such as “We Shall Overcome,” as opposed to simply reading its lyrics out
loud.211 Similarly, a song whose lyrics are directed toward the exposition
of nonpolitical ideas or information with similar musical enhancement
might be viewed as protected under a truth-searching or autonomy theory.
There is even doctrinal support for the enhancement claim. In
Cohen v. California,212 the Supreme Court reviewed the case of a man
who was convicted for disturbing the peace when he wore a jacket
bearing the words “Fuck the Draft” into a public courthouse.213
Although the state asserted the power to regulate speech because of its
offensive nature, the Court invalidated Cohen’s conviction, finding that
the profanity that he used to express his clearly political views had
speech value because it conveyed the emotional force of his beliefs.214 In
other words, the specific words Cohen chose to communicate his
opposition to the government’s policy enhanced his message through
their emotional impact. “Fuck the Draft” transmits the passion of
Cohen’s opposition to the draft more powerfully than something more
muted, like “That Darned Draft.” Although the analogy to Cohen is
useful, its analysis still focused on the linguistic aspects of the speakers’
message.

211. Singing has long played a role in protests and social movements as both a means for
conveying messages and inspiring participants. From the work of American folk singers Woody
Guthrie and Pete Seeger in the twentieth century to the contemporary protest music of Pussy Riot,
musicians have been incorporating social justice messages into their songs in an effort to express
dissatisfaction with the status quo. See Bart Barnes, Folk Singer Wanted Everyone to be Heard,
Wash. Post, Jan. 29, 2014, at A1; Chris Kornelis, Woody Guthrie Gave Life to Protest Songs He
Wrote, Sang, Wash. Times, Oct. 11, 2012, at C10; Carol Rumens, Pussy Riot’s Punk Prayer Is Pure
Protest Poetry, Guardian (Aug. 20, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/books/2012/aug/20/pussy-riotpunk-prayer-lyrics; see also Buffalo Springfield, For What It’s Worth, on Buffalo Springfield
(ATCO Records 1967). The international scope of such expression is widely noted. See Anne Schumann,
The Beat That Beat Apartheid: The Role of Music in the Resistance Against Apartheid in South Africa,
14 Vienna J. Afr. Stud. 17 (2008); Sebnem Arsu, The Music Started, and the Protest Paused, N.Y. Times,
June 15, 2013, at C1.
212. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
213. Id. at 16. For an interesting evaluation of the role of the word “fuck” in American legal
culture, see Christopher M. Fairman, Fuck, 28 Cardozo L. Rev. 1711 (2007).
214. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 25–26.
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The limit of the enhancement claim, however, comes from the
notion that the musical elements of the speech are inherently tied to
verbal expression. If the reason music is expressive is solely derivative
through its enhancement of the verbal, it may have little or no
independent expressive value. To some degree (though the comparison is
not quite complete), it is no different from an amplification device such
as a megaphone. And if it has no distinctive substance, it would
necessarily be regulated only where it is attached to the verbal message,
and therefore unlikely to need additional First Amendment protection
that would not already be afforded to the lyrics. Greenman observes:
One might say that music is protected because it usually complements
language, that rulemaking tends to be categorical, and that instrumental
music is only protected by dint of its association with vocal music. This
is undoubtedly true to some degree. But even so, there must be some
principle determining what is communicative other than “association
with language.” People talk during violence, but violence is never
communication.215

Ultimately, the enhancement claim cannot stand alone as a justification
to protect instrumental music under the First Amendment.216

c.

Instrumental Music and Cognition

To this point, I have conceded that instrumental music does not
directly appeal to or stimulate any sort of cognitive reasoning. Before
leaving the topic, however, it is worth considering whether I have given
up too easily on a direct cognitive defense. I refer to this as the pure
cognitive claim. Most theorists would argue that instrumental music is a
form of nonpropositional expression, meaning that it does not intend (or
does not always intend) to convey, nor can it be understood to convey, a
particular, identifiable message.217 While that is undoubtedly the case,
that is not tantamount to saying that instrumental music does not
stimulate, inspire, suggest, or provoke cognitive processes.
Indeed, some music theorists reject the idea that instrumental music
is not representational. For example, as Karol Berger observes, “‘most or
even all music will likely have to be considered representational,’ for
reasons analogous to those brought forward by Richard Wollheim in

215. Greenman, supra note 13, at 1367 n.136.
216. One possibility that I do not account for is that musical expression may be inextricably linked
not only to its lyrics and title, but also to its social history and the context in which it is composed,
performed, heard, and experienced. If this is the case, then the theoretical attempt to disaggregate
music into its component parts may be misguided. If, indeed, music cannot be disentangled from its
social history, this would present a strong, alternative claim for why it is covered by the First
Amendment. I am grateful to Rebecca Aviel for pointing out this potential complexity. Because it is
beyond the ambition of this Article, for now I set this argument aside for future discussion.
217. Tushnet, supra note 3, at 203 n.117; see also Bezanson, Art and Freedom, supra note 3, at
280 (describing most art as nonpropositional).
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support of his thesis that both figurative and abstract painting are species
of representational art.”218 If this point is valid, however, what exactly is
being represented? Berger suggests that the music may be representative
of a person or object:
In instrumental music, or in vocal music with independent (obbligato is
the technical term) instrumental line(s), the instrumental line can
sometimes be attributed to a source that resembles to a certain degree
a human person or another object we could name, but it can also
remain so abstract that we will not be tempted to attribute it to a
human or any other kind of recognizable source.219

One could object to the claimed representational value, here, because of
Berger’s qualification that such attribution can be made only “sometimes.”
However, spoken or written words can sometimes also be communicated
in ways that do not have representational value, yet we do not dispute
their protection under the First Amendment.220
Similarly, the formal reliance on language as a precondition of
constitutional protection may overemphasize the belief that all language
conveys unambiguous ideas or information. Language cannot always
convey experiences the way that the arts are capable of doing. Berger
argues:
Language’s attempt to name the particular is always frustratingly
imprecise when compared with a direct experience of the particular,
because the name brings the particular under a general concept,
associates it with many other particulars, and thus blunts the sharp
edges of its particularity. But . . . this tells us something about the
nature of language, not of music.221

In a widely cited letter, Felix Mendelssohn expressed a similar, though
counterintuitive sentiment:
People complain usually that music is so ambiguous, that it is so
doubtful what they should think with it, while words are understood by
anyone. But for me it is exactly the other way around. And not just
with whole speeches, also with individual words; also these seem to me
so ambiguous, so indefinite, so easily misunderstood in comparison
with true music . . . . What a piece of music which I love tells me are for
me not thoughts that are too indefinite to be grasped in words, but
ones too definite. Thus I find in all attempts to express these thoughts
in language something right, but also something insufficient. . . .
because a word does not mean for one what it means for another,
because only a song (without words) can tell one the same thing it tells

218. Karol Berger, A Theory of Art 173–74 (2000).
219. Id. at 174.
220. And, of course, a single word’s meaning may vary widely depending on its usage, context, and
emphasis. See generally Fairman, supra note 213.
221. Berger, supra note 218, at 209.
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another, can awaken in him the same feeling, a feeling, however, which
does not express itself in the same words.222

Nietzsche similarly observed that “in relation to music, all communication
by means of words is of the shameless sort.”223 If we are to accept
Mendelssohn’s claim, however, we must be willing to embrace a paradox—
that instrumental music is both a precise form of expression and, at the
same time, not reducible to words. Furthermore, the meaning is
apparently, and unapologetically, subjective. For Mendelssohn writes
about not all works of music, but works that he loves, and what they tell
him.
Furthermore, instrumental music could be conceived as conveying
cognitive messages not about language, but about mathematical patterns,
sequences, and harmonies. After all, as others have noted, in ancient
Greece, music was considered to be one of the four mathematical liberal
arts, or quadrivium.224
Another question is whether this cognitive understanding of
instrumental music differs from its value as expressive of emotion—or
even if it does differ, how it can be conceptualized as expressive in a
manner with which the First Amendment ought to be concerned. The
emerging interdisciplinary field of music cognition, in which scholars
study the connection between musical expression and cognitive function,
may lend some insights into this somewhat non-intuitive claim.225 Even if
a connection between instrumental music and cognition were established,
however, there may be an important expressive difference between
stimulating cognitive functioning and communicating an identifiable
message. In any event, we probably still know far too little about this
field to suggest that a legal theory be built on its foundation.
Furthermore, it is unclear which of the predominant speech theories
this definition of musical expression fits under. Even if we accept that
instrumental music conveys definite thoughts in the sense that
Mendelssohn described, without a common understanding of such
thoughts, it is impossible to determine either why the expression is
valuable or how the state would know that it needs to be suppressed (or,
for that matter, how a court would know that it deserves First
Amendment protection). Thus, it is difficult to see how this type of
cognitive understanding could be justified under a democratic selfgovernance theory. Perhaps, however, the unspecified cognitive thoughts
generated by instrumental music may help a listener to understand
certain truths, and that this conception is actually supported by the search
222. Id. at 210.
223. Lawrence Kramer, Expression and Truth on the Music of Knowledge 98 (2012).
224. Carroll, supra note 15, at 1422.
225. See, e.g., Hans Heinrich Eggebrecht, Understanding Music: The Nature and Limits of
Musical Cognition (2010).
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for truth rationale, or some versions of it. Just because the state cannot
identify the area of inquiry or thought does not mean that its interference
with musical expression does not inhibit the individual’s ability to reach
that truth on her own. And it does not even have to be an abstract or
metaphysical truth. Music might lead one to understand truths in a
philosophical or spiritual sense, if not a political (narrowly defined) one.
Finally, if music stimulates nonspecific cognitive processes in the
listener, it is certainly true that autonomy is undermined by the
government’s prevention of the ability to hear that music. The Court’s
strong admonition in Stanley about the impropriety of the state’s role in
controlling what we may read or watch surely applies to what we listen
to.226 If this is true for legally obscene movies, so it must be true for the
experience of listening to music of one’s choice, particularly if that music
is understood to have a specific cognitive content. Ultimately, however,
the idea of instrumental music as cognitive expression lacks sufficient
support at this point to justify its coverage as speech under the First
Amendment.

2.

Instrumental Music as an Expression of Culture, Religion, and
Other Social Values

Music that is not tied to a specific idea or message can nonetheless
be closely associated with cultural, ethnic, religious, and social values.
Here, we can identify a distinct expressive value to the instrumental
aspects of music, and one that can be harmonized with specific First
Amendment theories. We can call this the cultural claim. There are
numerous examples of instrumental music censorship because of these
culturally expressive values that provide a context for understanding why
constitutional protection might be important.
Instrumental music expresses culture in several important ways.
First, while most North Americans and Europeans are familiar with the
Western twelve-note chromatic scale, music from other cultures is
distinctly identifiable by its reliance on other scales that include
additional notes that fall in between the tones of those twelve notes.227
This is exemplified by the Indian raga, which uses intervals smaller than
those in the Western scale, creating a sound that resonates of South
Asian culture. Another example involves the African influence on
American roots music, particularly the blues, which uses notes, such as
the so called “blue” note, a pitch that falls between a major and minor
third above the chord’s root. The blue note is not commonly used in
American music that has been heavily influenced by its European
antecedents.
226. 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969).
227. See Munkittrick, supra note 4, at 670.
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Some forms of singing involve no words, but instead use tones and
timbres that are indigenous to and distinctive of a particular culture. One
commentator observes:
Cultural preferences for particular vocal timbres are, like the entire
process of vocalization, essentially intuitive. We learn how a singer’s
voice should sound by hearing singers, and the preferred timbres of our
own musical culture are acquired early and usually taken for granted.
The automatic nature of this conditioning is apparent when we hear
singing from an unfamiliar culture with aesthetic values different than
our own.228

A paradigmatic example of this phenomenon is Tuvan throat singing,
which involves the use of the singer’s vocal apparatus to produce a
droning sound while simultaneously making audible melodic sounds
through the production of overtones.229 Such singing “both imitates and
interacts with the mountainous, riverine landscape of the Tuvan
countryside, and the horse-centered lifestyle of the Tuvan people.”230
Differences in meter are also important and, again, often specifically
identifiable with particular cultures. Thus, rhythmic and polyrhythmic
patterns may be distinctively associated with culture. The Black Codes’
bans on slave drumming were, at one time, thought to have been an
attempt to eliminate African polyrhythms from black music in
America.231 More recently, African rhythms were the source of at least
one concern about the emergence of rock and roll music in the 1950s, as
censors worried that the beats were highly sexualized.232 There was a
pervasive and fairly transparent racial bias embedded in these concerns
about the rhythms of rock as well.233
In addition, adapting performances of the music of one culture to
the instruments, scales, rhythms, and musicality of a very different
culture can produce a completely new cross-cultural musical creation that
evokes new meaning. An acute example of this is the performance of
Brubeck’s American jazz classic “Take Five” by Pakistan’s Sachal
Studios Orchestra.234 This type of musical cross-fertilization is also
represented in the mutual influence of African and American music on

228. James R. Cowdery & Stan Scott, Exploring the World of Music: An Introduction to
Music From a World Music Perspective 163 (Dorothea E. Hast ed., 1999).
229. Id. The Tuvans are nomadic herders who live in the mountains of Central Asia. Id.
230. Id.
231. Palmer, supra note 201, at 36–37. For a discussion of the culturally unique polyrhythms of
African music, see Gioia, supra note 201, at 11.
232. Linda Martin & Kerry Segrave, Anti-rock: The Opposition to Rock ’n’ Roll 53 (1993). Of
particular interest here is the announcement of a San Antonio City Councilman that “[t]he First
Amendment should not apply to rock and roll.” Id. at 271.
233. See id. at 41.
234. Sachal Studios Orchestra, Take Five, on Sachal Jazz: Interpretations of Jazz
Standards & Bossa Nova (Sachal Music 2011). I am grateful to Ash Bhagwat, from both a musical
and analytical standpoint, for introducing me to this performance.
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one another during the emergence of jazz music in the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries.235 “Anthropologists call this process ‘syncretism’—the
blending together of cultural elements that previously existed
separately.”236 This also reflects the notion that what probably “feels” like it
belongs to a particular culture is at least in part socially constructed.237
Preservation of music has long been an essential component of
maintaining culture over generations. The preeminent jazz historian Ted
Gioia notes:
The concept of progress plays a modest role in most ethnic musics . . . .
The griots of West Africa aim to preserve their musical tradition as it is
handed down to them. This is not a mere aesthetic choice, but a
cultural imperative: they are the historians of their society and must
maintain the integrity of their precious musical heritage. Such an
attitude defines casual experimentation.238

Consistent with the understanding that the association between
music and culture is strong, the U.N. Educational, Scientific, and
Cultural Organization and World Intellectual Property Organization
crafted the 1982 Model Provisions for National Laws on the Protection

of Expressions of Folklore Against Illicit Exploitation and Other
Prejudicial Actions. These standards define “expressions of folklore” to

include: “[p]roductions consisting of characteristic elements of the
traditional artistic heritage developed and maintained by a
community . . . or by individuals reflecting the traditional artistic
expectations of such a community, in particular . . . (ii) musical
expressions, such as folk songs and instrumental music.”239
Music can also be closely associated with religion, making it a
potential target for government regulation. As discussed earlier, two
recent federal cases involved challenges to public schools’ efforts to ban
instrumental music because of its religious associations.240 In both cases,
the schools chose to ban student musical performances because they
believed that permitting them would raise concerns about the schools’
neutrality toward religion, generating complaints from parents and
potentially violating the Establishment Clause.241 But in neither case did
the schools categorically ban the performance or study of religious
235. See Gioia, supra note 201, at 5.
236. Id.
237. Carroll, supra note 15, at 1417 (“Music has no intrinsic definition. It is a cultural category
consisting of any sounds that those in a society or culture designate as ‘music’ instead of ‘noise,’ along
with any notation, recording, or other means of capturing or representing such sounds.”).
238. Gioia, supra note 201, at 200.
239. U.N. Educ., Scientific, & Cultural Org. & World Intellectual Prop. Org., Model
Provisions for National Laws on the Protection of Expressions of Folklore Against Illicit
Exploitation and Other Prejudicial Actions 9–10 (1985).
240. Nurre v. Whitehead, 580 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2009); Stratechuk v. Bd. of Educ., 587 F.3d 597
(3d Cir. 2009).
241. Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1096; Stratechuk, 587 F.3d at 604.
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music.242 In Nurre, the school expressly permitted performance of
religious music at midyear concerts if the purpose of the performance
was for the “artistic value” and was performed along with an “equal
number of other non-religious works.”243 In Stratechuk, the school
district’s policy permitted the study of religious music in the curriculum
“provided that it achieve[d] specific goals of the written curriculum in
various fields of study; that it [was] presented objectively; and that it
neither inhibit[ed] nor advance[d] any religious point of view.”244 In
these examples, we see government actors connecting even instrumental
music with religious belief, and the understanding that its expression
conveys a message or idea of religious significance that the state did not
want to appear to endorse or favor. Interestingly, the schools’ policies
raise the question of whether musical expression takes on a different
meaning depending on the context in which it is performed. As Dewey
once asked, “[i]s the same music nonrepresentative when played in a
concert hall and representative when it is part of a sacramental service in
a church?”245
Conversely, instrumental music can be associated with sacrilege, or
with conduct or values that are sacrilegious. In many sectariandominated government regimes, censorship of instrumental music on
these grounds is common. Though scholars of Islamic culture have
divergent views about music’s role in Islam,246 the previously Talibancontrolled Afghanistan247 and the current Iranian government248 have
banned instrumental music because of its association with nonpuritanical values, licentious lifestyles, and alcohol or drug use. And, of
course, religiously based music censorship is by no means limited to
Islam, as the Catholic Church’s ban on the tritone and descant make
clear.249
Music can not only be reflective or representative of existing or past
cultures, but also may operate to construct and define cultures. The
experience of banned Jewish composers and performers during the Nazi
regime reflects their struggle to maintain two important strands of
musical influence—they were both Germans and Jews and both were
constitutive of their musical culture.250 The Reichsmusikkammer tried to
242. Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1091; Stratechuk, 587 F.3d at 599–600.
243. Nurre, 580 F.3d at 1091.
244. Stratechuk, 587 F.3d at 599.
245. Dewey, supra note 188, at 223. Because I am concerned in this Article only with First
Amendment coverage, I do not address the idea that even if instrumental music is covered, it might
still be subject to some regulation depending on the context in which it is performed.
246. Abd-Allah, supra note 10, at 30–31.
247. Moss, supra note 10.
248. Tait, supra note 10.
249. See Rohrer, supra note 95; Blecha, supra note 97, at 15–16.
250. Haas, supra note 9, at 231–35.
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reconstruct domestic culture by reimagining German music without its
important Jewish influences. At the same time the Kulturbund was its
attempt to isolate Jewish musical culture and distinguish and separate it
from what was “truly” German.251 More contemporary examples of
music (albeit in these cases, lyrical as well as instrumental) as constitutive
of culture are communities that have formed around groups such as the
Grateful Dead (the “Deadheads”)252 and Insane Clown Posse (the
“Juggalos”).253 Each of these groups self identifies as its own distinctive
subculture.
To the extent that governments might censor instrumental music to
destroy or suppress cultural, ethnic, or religious values or identities or as
a way of implementing moral or social regulation, they are engaged in a
type of content discrimination that is familiar to traditional First
Amendment doctrine. With respect to First Amendment theory, viewing
instrumental music as an expression of cultural, religious, social, and
moral values suggests that at the very least it should be covered under a
truth-seeking and autonomy-based theory of freedom of speech. If we
view the First Amendment as protecting a diversity of ideas, beliefs, and
values about culture, religion, and society, protection of this aspect of
musical expression advances the ability to experience cultural diversity as
reflected through that music. Still, one might object to the truth-based
claim on the ground that even in this context, music is not expressing
particular ideas or beliefs, and its suppression does not interfere directly
with the individual or the collective desire to achieve truth, assuming we
are viewing the achievement of truth as some sort of rational process.
Turning to autonomy-based theories, the cultural claim might lead
to the conclusion that autonomy over the formation of one’s cultural,
religious, or moral identity is advanced by protection against government
control over the range of musical expressions of that identity. Identity
formation might not be ideational or involve the exercise of judgments,
and therefore might not fall within Scanlon’s concept of autonomy. But it
may be an important aspect of self-realization, as conceived of by
Redish, and also mesh well with Shiffrin’s thinker-based autonomy
theory,254 which acknowledges the value of becoming a distinct individual
(cultural and religious affinity) and living among others (distinguishing
oneself as well as connecting with others through culture and religion).

251. Id.
252. Grateful Dead: The Illustrated Trip 138 (Jake Woodward et al. eds., 2003).
253. Scott Mervis, Insane Clown Posse Is Back in the Dark Carnival, Pitt. Post-Gazette, May 20,
2010, at W10. These cultures are much more than what might be called “fan clubs,” but are, by their
nature and self-identification, subcultures of society. In an interesting twist, Insane Clown Posse and
some of its fans recently sued the Federal Bureau of Investigation for labeling the Juggalos as a
“gang.” Dave Itzkoff, Rap Group Defends Fans, with Lawsuit, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 2014, at C1.
254. Shiffrin, supra note 148, at 289–90.
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This understanding of expression also distinguishes instrumental music
from other autonomous conduct that we would agree should not be
protected, such as engaging in violence,255 “trading on the stock
market,”256 or “playing tennis.”257
I have thus far set aside the possibility that instrumental music’s
expression of culture, religion, or values might support a democracybased theory of free speech. However, there is also an argument that
instrumental music might convey values of patriotism and nationalism.258
Instrumental music’s ability to create social cohesion may in fact enhance
democracy, though not in the traditional discursive way that free speech
theorists typically identify. Thus, for example, the marches of John Philip
Sousa or the national anthems of other nations could be said to be
strongly identified with such values. Government control of instrumental
music to instill nationalism or suppress anti-nationalist values could be
construed as a form of viewpoint discrimination that would justify
protecting speech even under a narrow version of the democratic selfgovernance speech theory. However, it is unclear whether music such as
Sousa’s is inherently nationalistic or patriotic, or whether it is actually
just a different example of the associative claim. Sousa’s compositions,
after all, bear patriotic titles and many of his songs have lyrics. Moreover,
even nationalism and patriotism can be conceptualized as cultural values,
which would place this example neatly within the cultural claim, along
with the notion that protection of nationalistic music advances truth
seeking and autonomy-based speech values.

3.

Instrumental Music as Expression of Emotion

A common thread of argument is that instrumental music is
communicative because it appeals not to reason, but to emotion. Indeed,
the Supreme Court has recognized music’s capacity to appeal to emotion,
albeit without a full explanation of that function.259 Like many forms of
verbal expression, instrumental music has the capacity to inspire, sadden,
excite, give joy, anger, confuse, frighten, and lead to other forms of
emotional or visceral responses in the listener. I will label this the
emotional claim.
Perhaps the most intuitive argument for music’s expressive value is
its ability to evoke noncognitive responses in listeners, as well as in its
composers and performers. That is, completely disassociated from titles,
linguistic signals, and other forms of art, instrumental music can be
255. Greenman, supra note 13, at 1339.
256. Bork, supra note 11, at 25.
257. Id.
258. For a general consideration of the nationalistic elements of patriotic symbols, songs, and
ceremonies, see Alan K. Chen, Forced Patriot Acts, 81 Denv. U. L. Rev. 703 (2004).
259. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 790 (1989).
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expressive in important ways that elicit emotional and spiritual
responses. The emotional claim therefore perhaps presents the cleanest
analytical argument for categorizing purely instrumental music as a form
of constitutionally protected expression.
This conceptualization of the power of music goes back to at least
Plato, who wrote that “[m]usical training is a more potent instrument
than any other, because rhythm and harmony find their way into the
inward places of the soul, on which they mightily fasten, imparting grace,
and making the soul of him who is rightly educated graceful, or of him
who is ill-educated ungraceful.”260 Plato, who may have been influenced
by Socrates’s views on music, believed that “specific scales, rhythms, and
instruments can affect human passions in specific ways and thus form
character.”261 Aristotle, in turn, believed that “[m]usic . . . directly
imitates (that is, represents) the passions or states of the soul . . . when
one listens to music that imitates a certain passion, he becomes imbued
with the same passion.”262
All three, however, claimed that precisely because music had the
power to instill passion, it also had the potential for dangerous influences
on the people. Plato was probably the most wary of the dark side of
musical expression, attributing moral decline in ancient Greece to the
composition of licentious musical works.263 He warned that “[a]ny
musical innovation is full of danger to the whole State, and ought to be
prohibited. . . . [W]hen modes of music change, the fundamental laws of
the state always change with them.”264 Similarly, Aristotle wrote of his
concern for music’s rousing of “ignoble passions.”265
Hegel also explored musical expression in his lectures on aesthetics,
although to a lesser degree than he examined other fine arts.
Interestingly, given the modern tendency (generally, and under the law)
to focus on music’s lyrical elements, Hegel’s understanding of musical
expression emphasized the music and observed that when words
accompany music, they are peripheral to the music itself. He wrote, “the
text is the servant of the music and it has no other worth than creating for
our minds a better idea of what the artist has chosen as the subject of his
work.”266 Hegel conceived of instrumental music as originating in
“interjection,” which he defined as the immediate utterance of feeling or
260. Plato, supra note 94, bk. III, at 401.
261. Berger, supra note 218, at 120.
262. Donald Jay Grout & Claude V. Palisca, A History of Western Music 7–8 (4th ed. 1988).
263. Isobel Henderson, Ancient Greek Music, in 1 The New Oxford History of Music 395 (Egon
Wellesz ed., 1957).
264. Plato, supra note 94, at 424.
265. Grout & Palisca, supra note 262, at 8.
266. 2 G. W. F. Hegel, Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art 934 (T. M. Knox trans., 1975). In
drawing on aesthetic theory, I follow the lead of Sheldon Nahmod’s excellent work on visual arts. See
generally Nahmod, supra note 3.
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emotion.267 For him, rhythm, harmony, and melody free the soul to hear
its inner movement and be moved by what it hears.268 More specifically,
through its conveyance, music allows listeners to experience feelings of
love, longing, joy, and grief.269
Schopenhauer also examined the emotional component of
instrumental music, but viewed its evocation of the emotional at a more
abstract level. He distinguished the feeling of specific emotions about
people, things, or events from general feelings. “[M]usic does not express
this or that particular and definite pleasure, this or that affliction, pain,
sorrow, horror, gaiety, merriment, or peace of mind, but joy, pain,
sorrow, horror, gaiety, merriment, peace of mind themselves.”270
Dewey similarly thought of music as an art that directly stirred
emotional responses. “[I]n itself the ear is the emotional sense,” he
wrote.271 He elaborated, “Sounds have the power of direct emotional
expression. A sound is itself threatening, whining, soothing, depressing,
fierce, tender, soporific, in its own quality.”272 Moreover, it was
specifically the instrumental elements of musical expression that bore
this capacity. “Through the use of instruments, sound is freed from the
definiteness it has acquired through association with speech. It thus
reverts to its primitive passional quality.”273 “[B]y the use of harmony
and melody of tone,” he wrote, music “introduces incredibly varied
complexities of question, uncertainty, and suspense wherein every tone is
ordered in reference to others so that each is a summation of what
precedes and a forecast of what is to come.”274
On this understanding, instrumental music has the capacity to
inspire, sadden, excite, give joy, anger, confuse, frighten, and lead to
other forms of emotional or visceral responses in the listener. While this
understanding is itself intuitively accepted by many, it is not an
indisputable interpretation of the expressive qualities of music. There is a
complex and rich discourse in the field of philosophy of music that
engages this topic as well, though a complete exposition of the competing
theories is beyond the scope of this Article.275

267. Hegel, supra note 266, at 934.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Arthur Schopenhauer, 1 The World as Will and Representation 261 (1958).
271. Dewey, supra note 188, at 237.
272. Id. at 238.
273. Id. at 239.
274. Id.; see Berger, supra note 218, at 120 (“Music’s historical edge over painting or poetry
consists only in this, that, with its inherent tendency toward abstraction, it was able to provide moods
without the admixture of anything else earlier than the other arts were.”).
275. Andrew Kania, The Philosophy of Music, Stan. Encyclopedia Phil. (July 31, 2012),
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/music/#3.
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Understanding instrumental music as communicating and evoking
emotion provides arguments both for and against treating it as speech
under the First Amendment. It most likely weighs against arguments
from a democratic self-governance perspective, even under broad views
of what contributes to democracy.276 Meiklejohn argued that the arts
were constitutionally protected because they are a form of
communication that allows voters to derive “knowledge, intelligence,
[and] sensitivity to human values,”277 but it has never been clear in what
way the arts in general, or music in particular, facilitate that process in
voters. We typically view the formation of political beliefs and ideals as a
deliberative and at least quasi-rational process, so it is difficult to see
how the protection of a form of expression that appeals exclusively to
emotional sensibilities advances the political process. Even under a more
nuanced version of the democratic self-governance theory, such as
Post’s,278 it is unclear how emotional expression contributes to public
discourse.
Some theorists might suggest that communication that appeals
purely to passion or emotion has at least some democracy-promoting
function. For example, Weinstein acknowledges that there is some power
to the argument that pornography should not be excluded from the
category of expression because it appeals to passions rather than
reason.279 But he adds that it would be odd to then rely on arguments
that passion-eliciting speech should be protected under a rational
thought, reason-based speech theory, which is at the core of most
democracy-based arguments.280 Others, like Martha Nussbaum, however,
suggest that the distinction between emotion and cognitive deliberation
is overstated, and that emotions, such as love and grief, are “intelligent
responses to the perception of value.”281
Consideration of the value of speech that is purely or primarily
emotional to either the individual or the collective search for truth is
more complex. As discussed earlier, most truth-based theories, though
they extend the freedom of speech realm well beyond the political, are
still largely about truths in opinion or ideas, whether they be political,
religious, or philosophical. Even when focused on spiritual truth, these
theories tend to be about morality and religiosity (or perhaps, as I argue,

See, e.g., Meiklejohn, supra note 132.
Id.
See generally Post, supra note 139.
James Weinstein, Free Speech Values, Hardcore Pornography and the First Amendment: A
Reply to Professor Koppelman, 31 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 911, 921 (2007).
280. Id.
281. Martha C. Nussbaum, Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions 1 (2001); see
Andrew Koppelman, Free Speech and Pornography: A Response to James Weinstein, 31 N.Y.U. Rev.
276.
277.
278.
279.

L. & Soc. Change 899, 905 n.42 (2007).
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culture) rather than more abstract conceptions of the spiritual. So truth
theorists tend to underscore the achievement of truth through speech’s
contribution to cognitive evaluation and assessment. Even a strong claim
that instrumental music conveys emotion, then, would not necessarily
satisfy the truth-finding justification for its protection.
Autonomy theories appear to present a stronger claim with regard
to protecting instrumental music on an account that understands music as
expressing the emotional. The power of that claim, however, depends on
one’s definition of the scope and purpose of autonomy. That is, the limits
of autonomy theory to justify the protection of instrumental music as a
form of emotional expression are, like other critiques, related to
questions about the level of generality at which autonomy is defined. The
challenge is to say something more than that protection of instrumental
musical expression promotes individual self-realization, fulfillment, and
autonomy.282 What distinguishes instrumental music as a form of
autonomous expression turns on what type of autonomy we are trying to
protect.
Mill spoke about discovery of ideas and protection of opinion, both
of which fail to encompass the emotional.283 Scanlon’s articulation of
autonomy focuses on the protection of the autonomous individual’s
ability to determine for himself “what he should believe or what he
should do.”284 These iterations of autonomy theory suggest that the
individual must be able to evaluate and advance independent reasons,
and weigh the value of others’ opinions against countervailing opinions
and evidence.285 Even divorced from democracy and truth finding, this
autonomy theory seems based on protecting the individuals’ ability to
reason and form opinions without governmental interference or
distortion, which seems cognitive, not emotional.
However, viewing concepts of autonomy from the perspectives of
Redish, Baker, and Shiffrin may provide a sounder basis for claiming
that emotionally expressive musical speech promotes autonomy in a
particularized manner. A notion of emotional autonomy as a path to
individual self-realization leads to a robust argument for First
Amendment protection for instrumental music. Redish’s self-realization
is a little harder to link to the emotional claim, as even his broad
argument for the autonomous individual seems directed at promoting the
individual’s ability to make “life-affecting decisions,” which implies some
sort of deliberative, as opposed to emotional, process.286 Although Baker
282. Tushnet, supra note 3, at 205–07. Because in the end, autonomy is promoted by lots of things
that are not protected by the First Amendment.
283. Mill, supra note 159, at 13–14.
284. Scanlon, Theory, supra note 166, at 216.
285. Id.
286. Redish, supra note 168, at 593.
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argues that an autonomy theory presents the stronger case for protecting
what he calls “compositional” music, he never articulates precisely how
protection of musical expression contributes to the version of autonomy
he embraces.287 He suggests that “[a] person’s autonomy might
reasonably be conceived as her capacity to pursue successfully the life
she endorses—self-authored at least in the sense that, no matter how her
image of a meaningful life originates, she now can endorse that life for
reasons that she accepts.”288 If we conceive of that as including the
individual’s capacity to pursue an autonomous emotional life—through
the vehicle of composing, performing, or listening to music that makes
her feel or not feel sad, excited, angry, exhilarated—then Baker’s form of
autonomy would support protecting instrumental music on the emotional
claim.
This type of autonomy claim is also supported by the increasing
body of neuroscience research, which suggests that the emotions elicited
by musical expression have direct biological effects on the human brain,
including the release of dopamine, a chemical neurotransmitter that
produces pleasurable stimulation and causes the body to desire more
from the source of stimulation.289 One can imagine a science fiction plot
in which the state is able to control—through laws, force, and
medication—individuals’ emotional states in a manner that precludes
them from self-realization in more than a decisionmaking autonomy
sense, but from interfering with the core of their very identities. Such
totalitarian control would be viewed as unacceptable, even if there were
no comparable interference with traditional forms of speech and political
deliberation. It is this type of loss of autonomy that Shiffrin’s thinkerbased approach best addresses. Her references to “apprehending the
true” and “imagination” imply protection of emotional autonomy as
much as the freedom to deliberate rationally over more concrete aspects
of existence.290 Moreover, “responding authentically”291 may quite
arguably encompass being allowed to live one’s life as the emotional
person one chooses to be.

287. Baker, supra note 148, at 271.
288. Id. at 253.
289. See Robert J. Zatorre & Valorie N. Salimpoor, Why Music Makes Our Brain Sing, N.Y.
Times (June 7, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/09/opinion/sunday/why-music-makes-our-brainsing.html (“When pleasurable music is heard, dopamine is released in the striatum . . . which is known
to respond to naturally rewarding stimuli like food and sex and which is artificially targeted by drugs
like cocaine and amphetamine.”).
290. Shiffrin, supra note 148, at 289–90.
291. Id.
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C. Speech Theory and Instrumental Music
As we have seen, one of the central challenges to treating
instrumental music—which is similar to much but not all other artistic
expression—as speech is that music inherently lacks a particularized
message or idea. In fact, one of the reasons music can be so uniquely
expressive is in this very absence of message. It may well be that speech
theorists have made too much of the line between representational and
nonrepresentational expression. Words can sometimes be representational
(taken for their literal meaning), and can sometimes be nonrepresentational,
symbolic, enhance other speech, bear hidden meaning, or even convey utter
nonsense.292 A painting, sculpture, or even dance, can be a direct
representation or realist depiction of an event or action, or it can be an
abstract or even meaningless image, structure, or movement. One
solution is to suggest that all forms of art are covered by the First
Amendment when they are representational, but not when they are
nonrepresentational.293 But this would be normatively unsatisfactory
because it would be massively under-inclusive to the extent that we find
expressive value in nonrepresentational communication. And more
importantly, on this view, instrumental music would never be covered
because, as we have seen, isolated from its title, lyrics, and associations, it
is always nonrepresentational.
As I argue above, none of the theories about how instrumental
music communicates fit comfortably under a First Amendment theory
based on promoting democracy. After full consideration of the possible
manners in which instrumental music can be expressive, my argument
comes down to a combination of theories and justifications. Instrumental
music can best be understood as speech under the First Amendment
both through the recognition that it advances expression of important
forms of cultural, religious, nationalist, and other social values, and to the
extent that music has important aesthetic and emotional expressive
values, even if in both instances it fails to advance a precise, identifiable
message. The cultural claim, as discussed in more detail above, suggests
that music is an important element of constructing, expressing, or
representing values. As a reflection of cultural, religious, and other social
values, music serves a cohesive function in that it brings people together
in important ways.

292. On the last point, one would do well to carefully read Joseph Blocher’s insightful article. See
generally Blocher, supra note 79.
293. Cf. James Weinstein, Democracy, Sex and the First Amendment, 31 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc.
Change 865, 888–92 (2007) (considering the argument that pornography might be protected when the
producer’s intent is to change attitudes about sexual mores but not when the producer’s intent is
merely to provide sexual stimulation).
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This cohesion building function is clearly illustrated by an anecdote
about a performance by the Boston Symphony upon the announcement
of President Kennedy’s assassination. The conductor, Erich Leinsdorf,
after announcing that the President had died, spontaneously changed the
program to include the funeral march from the “Eroica,” Beethoven’s
Third Symphony.294 Recordings of the audience reflect their shocked
reaction to the news, followed by their silent contemplation of the
performance, which created a cultural experience of shared grieving
(though each individual no doubt experienced the moment quite
personally, as well).295
In its expression of culture, music serves important social functions
by connecting people within and between different communities, and its
recognition as a form of speech ensures that government efforts to
establish a cultural orthodoxy, like attempts to create a political or
religious orthodoxy, are thwarted. Instrumental music is therefore
covered because its protection advances what Jed Rubenfeld calls the
anti-orthodoxy principle.296 This argument suggests that it undermines
First Amendment values to allow the government to control cultural
(including racial) and other values and determine which values are
worthy, not in a political sense, but in a social one.
This reasoning is also consistent with a truth-seeking rationale. As
discussed earlier, truth under this theory is not limited to the
understanding of ideas, but can embrace religious, spiritual, or as I argue
here, cultural truths. For there is no one “true” culture or understanding
of culture, and the government cannot legitimately define what that
represents.297 Moreover, this definition of truth seeking responds to
boundary problems by at least limiting truth seeking to the notion of
cultural and social values, not to every conceivable type of truth.
At the same time, instrumental music serves a completely
individualizing function, and therefore ought to be covered by the First
Amendment to the extent that it promotes highly personal expressions
and experiences of emotion.298 Instrumental music allows people to
express (through composition, performance, and feeling) and experience
(through listening, interpreting, and feeling) as no other medium of
communication can. Thus, while music serves a community building
294. James Inverne, Listen to This Chilling Audio as Crowd at Boston Symphony Learns President
Kennedy Is Dead, Time (Nov. 11, 2013), http://nation.time.com/2013/11/11/boston-symphony-kennedyassassination.
295. Id.
296. Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 Stan. L. Rev. 767, 817–22 (2001).
297. I do not mean to say that the government has no role in shaping or supporting different
cultural values through funding and other types of official support, see Nat’l Endowment for the Arts
v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998), but that it is important that the state not attempt to interfere with the
shaping and natural evolution of various cultures in society.
298. See Munkittrick, supra note 4, at 671.
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function in terms of cultural expression, it simultaneously advances an
autonomy-promoting function in its facilitation of individualized
emotional expression and experience. As developed in more detail
above, music’s role in expressing, evoking, and experiencing the
emotional could easily be argued to promote self-realization.
The claim that instrumental music serves an important function in
constructing and maintaining cultural and other social values and in
expressing and experiencing emotion also leads us to another argument
for its inclusion as speech under the First Amendment. Thus far, I have
focused only on utilitarian or “consequentialist” speech theories, which
suggest that speech is protected where it advances specific individual or
social interests, such as democracy and autonomy. Another school of
First Amendment theorists argues that consequentialist theories are
inadequate or incomplete in explaining the right of free speech, and that
a more sound analytical focus is to closely scrutinize the government’s
reasons for regulating speech rather than on what is being regulated.299
As Larry Alexander writes, “[f]reedom of expression is implicated
whenever an activity is suppressed or penalized for the purpose of
preventing a message from being received.”300 Under this theory, free
speech “at its core requires regulators to abstain from acting on the basis
of their own assessments of a message’s truth or value.”301 The idea that
a “message” is involved still requires us to make an additional analytical
move to include purely instrumental music because, again, such music is
always nonpropositional. However, the core of Alexander’s argument is
essentially that speech ought to be a protected right when the
government’s reasons for regulating it are based on its belief that the
speech is either not true or has no value. Surely, a government ban on
instrumental music for the purpose of interfering with, extinguishing, or
otherwise adversely affecting cultural, religious, nationalistic (or antinationalistic), or other social values would be illegitimate. Likewise, state
regulation of music with the objective of snuffing out emotional
expression or experience would fall well outside the parameters of what
we would accept as valid government action. Thus, under nonconsequentialist theories of speech, the cultural and emotional claims
both also work as justifications for classifying instrumental music as
speech under the First Amendment.
Instrumental music is enigmatic. It both brings people together as a
community and sets them apart as individuals, and on this paradox its
true value as speech rests. That is not to say that instrumental music has
to have a particularized meaning to be covered, only that whatever

299. Alexander, supra note 127, at 9.
300. Id.
301. Id. at 11.
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meanings it conveys are not reducible to any message, but rather connect
to culture and individuality in ways that are not, in fact, expressible.

IV. Other Implications for Free Speech Theory and Doctrine
If any of these approaches to understanding musical expression
provides a sound justification for protecting instrumental music as
speech, it is worth considering what the implications of this conclusion
are for First Amendment theory, as well as for doctrinal applications to
other forms of speech that might be less widely accepted as protected.
As indicated above, a substantial segment of recent First
Amendment scholarship has been devoted to the “coverage” problem—
discourse about what types of expressive conduct, or even pure speech,
are covered (though not necessarily protected) by the First Amendment,
and which types simply do not count as speech, and are therefore not
even subject to traditional First Amendment analysis.302 By closely
analyzing the problem of instrumental music and speech—a presumably
“easy” case under First Amendment analysis—we can see, and perhaps
respond to, important tension points of free speech theory. Does
Spence’s supposed “particularized message” requirement apply to all
nonverbal modes of speech, or can expression that bears some other
value but cannot be reduced to a message count as speech? Can the
advancement of the search for truth include the protection of forms of
nonverbal expression that engender close ties to cultural values and at
the same time resist adherence to government orthodoxy about those
values? Does expression that evokes purely emotional, as opposed to
cognitive responses, qualify as speech such that its regulation implicates
concerns about government overreaching and interference with personal
autonomy for both speakers and listeners?
In attempting to answer these questions, the close analysis of
instrumental music suggests that perhaps these questions cannot be
addressed by a completely internal legal approach. As Schauer argues,
the notion of constitutional salience, which he describes as “the often
mysterious political, social, cultural, historical, psychological, rhetorical,
and economic forces that influence which policy questions surface as
constitutional issues and which do not,”303 may require insights drawn
from external sources. Aesthetic theory and music theory may be useful
in determining the extent to which more unfamiliar types of expression
might fit into the existing framework of thinking about speech.
In addition to theoretical considerations, paying closer attention to
the scope of the First Amendment’s coverage and the justifications for
treating instrumental music as speech may lead to greater insights into
302. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
303. Schauer, supra note 13, at 1768.
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thorny doctrinal questions. First, some academic treatments of other
areas of speech advocate an understanding of the First Amendment
suggesting that speech that appeals to the noncognitive ought not to be
covered. Schauer famously argues that pornography is not speech
because its primary purpose is to produce purely physical, rather than
mental, stimulation.304 In his view, pornography is more like a sexual aid
than a form of expression.305 Similarly, as Cass Sunstein argues:
[A]ny attempt to distinguish among categories of speech must start
with an effort to isolate what is uniquely important about speech in the
first place. Speech that is not intended to communicate a substantive

message or that is directed solely to noncognitive capacities may be
wholly or largely without the properties that give speech its special
status. Subliminal advertising and hypnosis, for example, are entitled to
less than full first amendment protection.306

Like Schauer, Sunstein contends that pornography appeals solely to
sexual arousal rather than cognitive reasoning.307
Another context that relates to music as speech is, as Sunstein
mentions, the regulation of subliminal or image-based advertising.
Scholars argue that images used to sell tobacco products, such as the
“Joe Camel” logo, can be constitutionally regulated because image
advertising does not convey a “particularized message” that appeals to
reasoning or cognition, but simply communicates a “generalized
aesthetic impact producing an emotional response.”308 Indeed, in arguing
for the lack of protection, one commentator suggests that image
advertising is unprotected precisely because it is exactly like instrumental
music.309
Both of these examples suggest that the First Amendment does not
cover expression that is designed to appeal purely to noncognitive,
emotional functions. But one could extend the same argument to
instrumental music. I have already argued the case for understanding
music as a form of communication that is valuable because of its unique
capacity to stir emotion. To the extent music has the capacity to appeal

304. Frederick Schauer, Speech and “Speech”—Obscenity and “Obscenity”: An Exercise in the
Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 Geo. L.J. 899, 923 (1979).
305. Id.
306. Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 Duke L.J. 589, 606 (emphasis
added). For a trenchant and persuasive critique of Sunstein’s arguments, see Larry Alexander, Low
Value Speech, 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 547 (1989).
307. Sunstein, supra note 306, at 606. If we accept this to be true, then it is curious how the
Supreme Court could exempt sexually explicit material that has “serious . . . artistic . . . value,” Miller
v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973), from the definition of obscenity. Such material might not always
appeal to cognitive capacities even if it is classified as art.
308. O. Lou Reed, Should the First Amendment Protect Joe Camel? Toward an Understanding of
Constitutional “Expression”, 32 Am. Bus. L.J. 311, 349–50 (1995).
309. Id. at 341 n.131 (“[A] . . . piece of instrumental music is neither true nor false. It simply is. It
may be expressive, but it is not speechlike.”).
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to emotional sensibilities, or even to excite or create a “mood” that
enhances the libido, it is also directed at and touches our noncognitive
capacities and might, under these arguments, fall outside the bounds of
the First Amendment. Conversely, if instrumental music is speech
covered by the First Amendment, why don’t the same arguments for its
inclusion mean that pornography and subliminal advertising are also
speech, the regulation of which ought to be considered by courts? A
partial response is that the argument for covering music under the First
Amendment is not tied exclusively to its emotionally communicative
value, but also to the notion of protecting cultural values and experience
and distrust of government orthodoxy where cultural and other social
values are concerned. Neither pornography nor subliminal advertising
can be easily understood to advance a particular cultural value, at least
not one recognized as culture in the common understanding of the term.
In drawing these comparisons, I do not mean to be making a claim,
either way, about whether pornography and subliminal messages always
ought to be viewed as speech. However, if these types of expression are
not covered by the First Amendment, I would argue that it is not because
they lack a particularized message and appeal only to emotion rather
than cognition.
Finally, a richer understanding of how instrumental music
communicates offers insights into free speech theory and doctrine as it
applies to other artistic expression, and particularly to abstract,
nonrepresentational painting, sculpture, and dance. As with music, there
are no easy answers to these seemingly easy cases. But further efforts at
increasing our understanding of these forms of expression should be
encouraged.

Coda
In this Article, I have demonstrated the complexity involved with
understanding instrumental music as a form of speech covered by the
First Amendment. The value in such an enterprise is not entirely
theoretical. Music continues to be suppressed around the globe by
governments and other powerful institutional actors. A more complete
understanding of its speech value and function is therefore critical to
advancing free speech doctrine.
Instrumental music does not convey a particularized message or
idea, does not appeal to reason, and does not transmit thoughts or beliefs
in an objectively identifiable form. Nonetheless, instrumental music is a
unique way of expressing and experiencing culture, and also can be
widely understood as an expression of or appeal to the senses in that it
has the capacity to convey and evoke joy, sadness, anger, melancholy,
and a multitude of other emotional responses. Both of these functions
connect to important values of advancing the search for truth and

Chen-66.2.doc (Do Not Delete)

February 2015]

3/21/2015 4:21 PM

INSTRUMENTAL MUSIC AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

443

promoting individual self-realization. As such, instrumental music enjoys
full status as speech under the First Amendment, even if it does not
advance democracy in any direct, meaningful, or understandable
manner.

